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Abstract 
 
 
This report examines social security units of assessment (UoAs) and considers the issues 
involved in moving towards an individualised system of social security.  We consider in 
some detail issues of what kinds of UoAs matter, when, for whom, and why, together with 
the possibilities for beneficial reform in the UK.  Its remit is confined to the social security 
and emergent tax credit systems for working-age people. It examines the experience of the 
UK in the light of the policy legacies and issues arising in the context of Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Australia. The issue of aggregation for state-provided social protection – 
be it through the tax or social security systems - remains an unresolved issue that must be 
addressed as part of any gender equality strategy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
WHAT ARE UNITS OF ASSESSMENT AND WHY DO THEY MATTER? 
 
What are units of assessment? 
This report examines social security units of assessment (UoAs) and considers the issues 
involved in moving towards an individualised system of social security.  Units of assessment 
refer to the unit that is used for the purposes of calculating benefit entitlement (the ‘resource 
unit’) and paying the benefit (‘the payment unit’) (Eardley et al, 1996; Millar and Warman, 
1996). Units of assessment fall into one of two types: individual or family/household. 
Individual UoAs are largely associated in the UK with contributory (National Insurance) 
benefits, categorical (contingent) benefits, while household UoAs are associated with means-
tested (social assistance) benefits.  The former are calculated on the basis of an individual 
claimant's work record or severity of disability or incapacity, while the latter are calculated 
on the basis of the combined income and resources of adult members of the household in 
which s/he resides (i.e. partner and in some cases other adult non-dependants) (the amount 
paid is also based on the composition of the household). Within the social security system of 
a single country, the definition of benefit and of resource units may vary between benefits, 
and even between claimant groups - for example between heterosexual and homosexual 
couples.  The most complex units of assessment are usually for means-tested benefits within 
which up to four different units of assessment may be used in the process from claiming to 
receiving payment: claiming (who applies for benefit); entitlement (which people are taken 
into account when calculating benefit); coverage (who the benefit is supposed to pay for); 
and payment (who receives the money) (Roll, 1991).  It is the last of these which has received 
most policy and scholarly attention.  Within the real lives of individuals several different 
assessment systems may apply at any one time. 
 
Why do units of assessment matter? 
Social assistance and other social security payments are intended to be the citizen’s last 
defence against poverty, destitution and adverse circumstances, yet where such assistance 
is paid to ‘the head of the family/household’ on behalf of others within that unit, the state 
has in effect delegated this last defence function to the payee. Moreover, those others within 
the unit whose resources have been channelled to the payee do not therefore have the same 
   
entitlement to social protection from the state as other citizens.  It is not within the scope of 
this report to fully review the evidence on individual or ‘hidden poverty’ within household 
units, or to defend an individual vs. a household definition of poverty; nonetheless, these 
issues, together with the effects of social security benefit receipt on the labour market 
behaviour of both payees and those other household members on whose behalf they receive 
payment, form the backcloth to the otherwise forbiddingly  ‘technical’ issue of assessment 
units and aggregation. 
 
This report considers in some detail these issues and the possibilities for beneficial reform 
in the UK.  It considers the working-age population and does not consider pensioners.  Its 
remit is confined to the social security system.  We do, however, consider tax credits through 
the UK’s tax credit system, which is as yet a work in progress rather than a well defined 
architecture, in addition to ‘traditional’ social security benefits.  The issue of aggregation for 
state-provided social protection – be it through the tax or social security systems - remains 
an unresolved issue, a ‘policy gap’ in New Labour’s income maintenance policy (see 
McLaughlin et al 2001 and Rake 2000).  
 
Although the basis of entitlement to National Insurance benefits in the UK is essentially 
individual, the social insurance system has also provided for dependants' allowances (that 
is, derived rights), thus merging principles of individual entitlement and familial 
aggregation. Derived rights are rights acquired by a spouse or other dependants of an 
insured person, although they are usually only payable after the insured person’s death.  In 
most countries today, some parts of the fiscal system are based on individual assessment.  
Most commonly, this is individual or separate taxation of husbands and wives, and individual 
entitlements to social insurance benefits.  However, other parts of the fiscal system are based 
on joint assessment of the nuclear family (most commonly defined as couples and their 
dependent children, if any).  For example, in social assistance, as we show in Chapter Four, 
eligibility for benefit is usually assessed on the basis of the combined income and/or number 
of hours worked by both partners.  Another way in which joint assessment is used is in the 
assessment of, and recovery from, the extended family of public funding of the long-term 
care needs of elderly disabled adults (although this has proved very difficult to enforce) (see 
Glendinning and McLaughlin, 1994). 
 
   
The post-war years in Europe saw a general movement towards greater individualisation of 
fiscal treatment and towards privacy and independence within the context of international 
Human Rights instruments. Indeed the recent UK extension of the principle of aggregation 
through the development of tax credits appears paradoxical in that context.  The 
development of integrated tax/benefit measures and the accompanying extension of means-
testing within the UK means an increasing number of people rely for all or part of their 
income on familially-aggregated provision. However, a social divide is growing between 
those adults who avoid all aggregation by living alone or by having high enough earned 
incomes to avoid both tax credits and traditional benefits on the one hand and those who 
partner with or without children and have low enough household incomes to enter the tax 
credit net or insecure enough incomes to claim traditional benefits, on the other.  These 
trends are transforming the political importance of issues of aggregation.  As such, the 
question put by Esam and Berthoud (1991)  a decade ago, ‘is it either essential or justifiable 
to assess the resources of couples jointly for social security purposes?'  should be addressed.  
Relatedly, the question of whether it is essential or justifiable to pay social protection for 
several individuals to just one of them must also be answered.  
 
The principle of familial responsibility for its members has existed in the UK and other 
countries' social security systems for centuries, in the forms of various liabilities of family 
members to maintain one another, and as a result women's social rights throughout the 
developed world are still closely associated with their family (marital and parental) status. 
Views of the appropriateness of these liabilities have, not surprisingly, changed 
considerably, especially since the 1970s. While ‘dependency’ on the state is seen as 
undesirable by almost all, ‘dependence’ on other family members is viewed by many but not 
by all as an acceptable and  'natural' function of the family (Webb, 1991: 45).  The 
consequences of this acceptance of individuals’ submergence within the family unit are that 
most married and cohabiting women lack individual entitlement to social security benefits, 
and have little or no independent incomes unless they are in paid work.  Yet many will be 
dissuaded from taking up, or staying in, employment, or increasing the number of hours they 
work because of the effects their actions will have on their partner's benefit or tax credit 
payments.  The institutionalised assumption in the UK of the idea that the social protection 
of non-employed women (often mothers of young children) should be secured by their 
   
appeal to the grace and favour of their husbands or cohabiting male  partners, may no longer 
be in tune with younger women’s or men’s views of what is ‘natural’, normal and desirable.   
 
Furthermore, the use of couples’ resources to determine benefit eligibility assumes that all 
income entering the household is equally shared or distributed amongst them, yet only a 
minority of couples actually pool their incomes fully (Pahl, 1980).  The pooling assumption 
has immediate and very direct consequences for women's incomes. A woman who is married 
to, or cohabiting with, a working male partner is usually unable to claim Income Support, 
whatever her personal income, as his wages bring the household resources above the income 
threshold at which means-tested benefits 'cut in'. The shift towards greater reliance on 
means testing over the last two decades, ostensibly as a strategy of 'targeting' of resources 
on those in greatest need, has failed to address the personal income needs of women and has 
contributed to 'depressing' the incomes of households, particularly low-income households. 
 
The individualisation agenda therefore opens up questions about the appropriate role of the 
family in income maintenance as well as the value placed by the state on social reproduction 
(that is, mothering and other caring). Both the financial obligations of fathers towards their 
non co-resident children and ex-partners and the obligations of adult children in respect of 
the health and social care of their elderly parents have brought to the fore similar issues 
around the appropriate responsibilities of family members towards each other in modern 
societies.  The Child Support reforms of the 1990s in particular crystallised many of these 
issues as we discuss in Chapter Two.  Political debate on, and opposition to, UK Child Support 
arrangements created deep divisions in social attitudes towards the financial liabilities of 
adults in intimate relationships towards each other. 
 
The use of the nuclear family as the combined benefit, resource and payment unit also raises 
a range of administrative 'problems', most notably how to define when two people living in 
the same household constitute a couple and how to define when a child ceases to be 
‘dependent'. As regards the former, the operation of the cohabitation rule in the 1960s and 
1970s meant that women with male lodgers, women with male friends, and women whose 
former partners maintained access to their children all fell under suspicion of cohabiting and 
were subject to investigation to determine their proper benefit entitlement and rate of 
payment (McLaughlin, 1999: 181). 
   
 
Parents on low incomes or unemployed and claiming Housing Benefit with employed 
children living at home have their benefit reduced on the assumption that their working 
children are contributing to the household rent. In this case, the unit of assessment functions 
works to 'cap' the family incomes of the poorest families. Most adversely affected are parents 
in receipt of benefit living with unemployed adult children (over 18s). It should be noted that 
these assumptions and their effects apply only to heterosexual couples since gay and lesbian 
couples are not recognised by the UK social security (or taxation) systems.  Individuals in 
gay couples apply for and receive individual rates of the relevant fiscal provision, whatever 
the personal incomes of each partner and whatever the degree of resource pooling which 
actually occurs between them. 
 
Issues of aggregation thus affect the personal incomes of some of the most vulnerable 
individuals and households in modern society.  They also affect labour supply and patterns 
of household formation and dissolution, particularly the propensity of adult couples to enter 
into heterosexual unions. Aggregation also bears on the arrangement of personal financial 
assets: sources of income, which can be transferred, will be transferred out of the ownership 
of a claimant or their partner so as to maximise his/her receipt of benefits. Dual addresses 
may be used to maintain a fiction of having alone and having no partner.  Webb referred to 
these as 'creative claiming' strategies (Webb, 1991: 41).   
 
The structure of this report  
We consider further how units of assessment issues have featured in UK policy thinking and 
development during the post war period in Chapter Two, before reviewing the theoretical 
and policy concerns underpinning the individualisation reform agenda in Chapter Three. In 
Chapter Three we consider marginal tax rates as they apply to second earners within families 
and review evidence from the UK and other countries in the EU and further afield as to the 
effects these have on labour market participation and women's personal incomes.  Chapter 
Four provides an overview of units of assessment in EU countries. Chapter Five focuses in 
depth on individualisation and aggregation experiences on the Republic of Ireland.  Chapter 
Six does likewise in respect of The Netherlands and Chapter Seven in respect of Australia.  
Our focus on the first two of these countries hereafter described as the European case study 
countries is due to the fact that they share with the UK a common historical past in terms of 
   
both social security policy and broader cultural and economic traditions. Australia has been 
included, albeit in rather less depth, in order to include some especially interesting policy 
developments in the field of aggregation and individualisation and to provide a non-
European perspective.  Finally, in Chapter Eight we address types of individualisation and 
aggregation reforms which could be adopted and suggest criteria for selecting between these 
options. 
 
   
CHAPTER TWO 
THE POST-WAR HISTORY OF AGGREGATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Introduction 
Although UK social policy has seen extensive discussion of the appropriate role of social 
assistance and social insurance, issues of aggregation and fiscal policy assessment have 
received far more cursory treatment both in academic and public debates.  Generally 
speaking, these debates have been concerned more with the form than with the content of 
family life; that is, they have been more concerned with differences or similarities of 
treatment between different family types than with the welfare of individuals within 
families.  The history of social security policy and administration in the UK exhibits a 
remarkable degree of continuity in respect of the familial assumptions and principles that 
have underpinned it.  Family responsibility (i.e. the liability of family members to maintain 
one another) and personal responsibility (i.e. self-reliance) have been enduring concerns 
and guiding principles of welfare policy debate ever since the Poor Laws. The household or 
family rather than the individual have been deemed the appropriate units of intervention, 
both for assessment of eligibility calculation and for the payment of benefits. This has 
reflected two assumptions: firstly, that it is right and proper for women to derive their 
financial security from the men with whom they reside; secondly, that social insecurity is 
primarily the result of the failure of the (male) 'family wage', whether because of low 
earnings or because of interruptions to male employment. Accordingly, it was assumed that 
if the problem of male unemployment were solved, women's need for social protection 
would also disappear (McLaughlin, 1999).  The consequence of this way of thinking has been 
that not only have women's personal incomes been limited but that personal income 
insufficiency among women has not been regarded as a legitimate policy problem in the 
same way that male personal and household income insufficiency has been.  The evolution 
of policy thinking, debate and practice around these issues from 1945 to 1995 is outlined in 
this chapter, while Appendix One outlines some of the main developments since 1997.  
 
The immediate post-war period 
Welfare policy debates and development in the immediate post World War II period in the 
UK are often characterised as reflecting a profound shift in public attitudes - a rejection of 
   
poor law selectivism and an embrace of collectivism, social solidarity and egalitarianism.  
Certainly, post WWII reforms can be understood in part as a reaction against the extensive 
pre-war use of means-testing across a range of welfare provisions - in housing, education, 
health, as well as social security.  The use of the household means test for the purpose of 
administering unemployment assistance (1931) generated popular hostility because it 
involved an intrusive enquiry into the financial circumstances of all members of the 
household (their possessions and income). The calculation and payment of means-tested 
benefit was associated with the methods of the poor law; its receipt signified entry into a 
'less eligible and less secure class' (Bakke, 1935, cited in Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983: 7). It 
entailed a possible withdrawal (partial or full) of benefit, the effect of which was to render 
claimants financially dependent on other household members. In other ways, too, the 
principle of family responsibility had been enshrined through the 'family wage' and the 
financial dependency of married women on their husbands for the purpose of social security 
benefits.  
 
Notwithstanding popular opposition to the means test, in government circles it enjoyed 
considerable support on a range of grounds, such as containing public spending, social 
justice (by targeting resources at those who 'genuinely' needed it), and upholding self-
reliance and family responsibility. Despite governmental support for the household means 
test, the 1941 Determination of Needs Act replaced the household means test with a family 
means test which restricted the test to the resources of adult (heterosexual) couples. 
However, this 'new' method of calculating benefit entitlement simply underwrote married 
(and cohabiting) women's financial dependency on their male partners.  The 1944 review of 
assistance by the Assistance Board had as its goal the simplification of the benefits system.  
While the Board recommended an increase in the scale rates set in order to render benefits 
adequate, it did not consider how the administration of benefits or in particular the principle 
of aggregation rendered social security inadequate for married women and children by 
perpetuating ‘hidden’ poverty.  
 
From a gender perspective, therefore, the profound shift in the policy paradigm towards 
egalitarianism that is said to have occurred just after the Second World War is not evident. 
Even the Beveridge Report (1942) assumed that married women's benefits need not be on 
same scale as those of married men (or single women's) since most women would make 
   
marriage their sole or main 'occupation'.  Any wages married women earned would merely 
be 'pin money' and their financial needs would be provided for by their husband.  In other 
words, the Beveridge plan attributed married women's financial security to their husbands 
rather than to the state social security system. This meant the state relied on husbands to 
claim for their wives and then to distribute the resultant income in whatever way they saw 
fit (McLaughlin, 1999: 181; Land, 1994; Lister, 1994).  
 
This strengthening of the family wage and family responsibility through the social security 
system in the 1940s was not unopposed. Indeed, it took place against the background of 
vociferous debate and campaigns.  Trade union leaders were committed to solving child 
poverty by gaining for male wage earners an income sufficient to support all their 
dependants without further subventions from the state. Throughout the pre- and post-war 
period a number of campaigns were also waged to promote the economic independence of 
women to support themselves and their children. Thus, Eleanor Rathbone and the Family 
Endowment Society (FES) argued that in supporting a uniform, adequate 'family wage', trade 
unions leaders were  
 
influenced by a secret reluctance to see their wives and children recognised as 
separate personalities, 'each to count for one and none for more than one' in the 
economic structure of society, instead of being fused in the multiple personality of the 
family with its male head. (Rathbone, 1924: 37) 
 
Rathbone and the FES campaigned for an endowment of motherhood - a state allowance or 
'salary' for childcare - which they firmly linked to the need for equal pay (Wilson, 1977). 
Being paid to mothers, ‘family allowances would reduce the dependence of wives upon 
husbands and would undermine the principle of the “family wage”, a doctrine that put 
women at a serious disadvantage in the labour market’ (Pascall, 1997: 219). Trade unions 
were concerned that family allowances would intensify the downward pressure on wages; 
others feared that such a step would undermine family responsibility (Wilson, 1977: 122). 
Economic independence was one of the arguments in favour of social dividend schemes, first 
proposed in the 1940s (Esam and Berthoud, 1991). Beveridge's policies were also opposed 
by the Women's Freedom League, which criticised the failure to give women independent 
status in social security (Williams, 1989):   
   
 
It is with the denial of any independent status to a women because she is married, the 
denial of their independent personality within marriage, that everything goes wrong 
and becomes unjust and ungenerous...Women's value is recognised in words, but 
there is no practical recognition of the needs of this central figure in our social 
economy. No independent status is given to her as citizen and worker. (Abbott and 
Bompas, 1943: 3-4)   
 
As we (McLaughlin, 1999; McLaughlin and Yeates, 1999) have previously argued, the 
assumption in both the contributory and non-contributory parts of the social security system 
that mothers, and by extension all adult women, are or ought to be exclusively engaged in 
unpaid caring work in the home, that any paid work they do outside is peripheral and that 
married or cohabiting women should look to men for financial support, has been part of 
more general social policies and provisions. These push women into, or keep women in, 
unwelcome family forms and relationships as well as holding them responsible for unpaid 
caring work (‘informal care’) into which they are drawn with varying degrees of reluctance 
or enthusiasm, inhibiting women’s labour market participation and their incomes.  On the 
other hand, separated, divorced and unmarried mothers, and women without children who 
were not cohabiting with a male partner have, since the late 1940s, been able to receive 
general-purpose social assistance benefits in their own right if they establish an independent 
household.  This 'right' to income from the state has until recently allowed lone mothers in 
the UK to claim such benefits without having to be available for paid work until their 
youngest child attains the age of 16.  Moreover, widows, both with and without children, 
could claim widow's pensions and benefits on the basis of their husband's insurance record 
(if he had one). Indeed, although social policy has sought to support both the economic 
system and the institution of the family, in many circumstances a woman with children will 
have been better off setting up an independent household and drawing social security in her 
own right rather than depending on a man who is earning very low wages or unemployed.  
For example, a woman alone has been more likely to be awarded exceptional needs grants 
(Wilson, 1977: 96; for other examples see McLaughlin et al, 1999).   
 
 
 
   
Family allowances 
Despite the assumption that wives should look to their husbands for financial security, 
pressure was mounted in the 1940s for the introduction of a system of family allowances for 
low-income families and for a greater contribution to be made by the state towards the costs 
of child care, particularly as growing sections of the workforce were now receiving child tax 
allowances (introduced in 1909). The policy debate over the payment of family allowances 
focused on, firstly, how the purpose of family allowances should be defined and whether 
allowances should be paid selectively rather than to all families, and, secondly, whether 
family allowances should be paid to the father rather than to the mother (Lewis (1991: 87).  
Modern readers will not be surprised to find that on the first issue, the Conservative party 
supported curtailing the overall cost by making family allowances either contributory or 
means-tested, while the Labour party urged that allowances should be universal (i.e. payable 
to all children of all parents) (Vincent, 1991).  In the event, universalist family allowances for 
the second and subsequent children were introduced in 1945; the first child was not 
included in recognition of the principle of family responsibilities towards the costs of raising 
children. Regarding the issue of to whom family allowances were to be paid Rathbone 
pressed for these to be paid to mothers through the post office since it was they who assumed 
primary responsibility for children's welfare. Paying family allowances to wives/mothers 
would furthermore provide a modicum of independent income and lessen their (and their 
children's) dependence on their husband/father for their economic welfare.  These were, 
however, modest economic gains to mothers compared with the economic value of child tax 
allowances which gravitated towards the 'wallets' of white-collar workers, and which, by 
1938 cost twice as much as family allowances did when they were introduced in 1945 
(Vincent, 1991: 72). Moreover, the introduction of universal family allowances owed very 
little to a concern with social justice or with women's economic independence, and a great 
deal to the belief that they would maintain work incentives and help to curb wage demands 
on the part of the male workforce (MacNicol, 1978; Lewis, 1991). 
 
Beveridge had expected that social assistance would assume less importance over time as a 
means of ensuring financial security, but the role of means-tests expanded during the 
following decades and, as Vincent notes, by the mid-70s at least 45 separate means-tests 
were in operation and three million people were in receipt of national assistance payments 
- three times the number in 1948 (1991: 170). The state’s systemic dependence on means-
   
tested benefits to ensure adequate income has had negative consequences for women due to 
the aggregation of couples’ incomes underpinning them. 
 
The 1970s and the development of in-work benefits 
The drift towards means-testing was consolidated by the Conservatives in the 1970s, in 
particular by the introduction in 1971 of a new benefit - Family Income Supplement – a top-
up to the low wages of full-time workers. Proposals for FIS had first been developed under 
Labour in 1967 but were defeated by opposition from trades unions and backbenchers 
(Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983: 80).  As McLaughlin (1994) argued, FIS was introduced as a 
result of the failure, inadequacy and inefficiency of 'the family wage' for men, combined with 
the inadequacies of family allowance and child tax allowances, especially for families where 
one or both earners were unskilled or unqualified. FIS was essentially devised as an 
alternative to up-rating universalist family allowances and it targeted working families 
rather than all families. Ostensibly designed to improve work incentives, FIS made up half 
the difference between income and a set scale and was payable for six months, irrespective 
of any change in circumstances. Both two- and one-parent families were entitled to FIS, but 
in the case of two-parent families, the man had to be the claimant and breadwinner (Deacon 
and Bradshaw, 1983: 81; Wilson, 1977: 93).  In addition to the problem of low take-up, was 
that of the 'poverty trap' (Field and Piachaud, 1971) as every increase in the breadwinner's 
earnings was penalised by a corresponding loss of benefit, thereby entrapping the poor at, 
or just below, subsistence level.  The accumulation of taxes and benefits on the marginal 
incomes of low-paid families not only undermined the work incentives of recipients, but also 
discouraged their female partners' labour market participation (McLaughlin 1994). 
 
In response to these criticisms, when the Labour Party returned to government in 1974 it 
retained FIS but combined child tax allowances and family allowances into a single Child 
Benefit, payable to the mother from 1977.  Labour faltered in its resolve to merge family 
allowances and child tax allowances into the new child benefit because of the financial 
transfer that would take place from the male wallet to the female purse.  Male trade unionists 
were not keen to see men's tax advantage in respect of child tax allowances disappear (Land, 
1977; Lewis, 1991; Pascall, 1997).  Child Benefit was paid to the mother on a universal basis; 
its receipt was not dependent on a test of means, contribution records, employment or 
marital status (Pascall, 1997).  However, the level of the award was, and has remained, very 
   
low. As Pascall (1997) argues, this reflected both women's poor bargaining position and 
governmental reluctance to undermine the male breadwinner principle.  Notwithstanding 
that, Child Benefit has been of great importance to mothers as a source of independent 
income, a point which will again be recognised if the new integrated child tax credit, which 
will replace Child Benefit and is under development is, as currently proposed, paid to the 
mother. 
 
 
The 1970s and the introduction of carer benefits 
The issue of an independent income for women also arose at this time with the introduction 
in 1976 of the Invalid Care Allowance (ICA), a non-contributory, non-means-tested benefit. 
This benefit was introduced as a result of lobbying on behalf of single women caring for 
elderly parents who wanted a non means-tested benefit in their own right (prior to this 
informal carers either relied on social assistance or on those to whom they provided care) 
(McLaughlin 1991).  The purpose of ICA was to protect incomes by partially replacing 
earnings lost or foregone in giving up paid work because of full-time caring responsibilities. 
It was available for men and single women 'of working age who would be breadwinners but 
for the need to stay at home and act as unpaid attendants to people who are severely disabled 
and need care'. A limited amount of 'short' part-time working was, and still is, permitted 
without it affecting benefit entitlement.  However, the rate of ICA was (and remains) very 
low so that it has limited value in replacing earnings; it was originally set at 60 per cent of 
short-term contributory benefits, regardless of how much care is provided or how long care 
giving continues (ibid.). The formal exclusion of married women from ICA embodied a 
central tenet of Beveridgean social security, namely that care-giving was a natural part of 
married women's 'duties' (Baldwin, 1994): ICA was designed only to cover 'exceptional' 
circumstances, which did not include married women it was assumed that they would be 
available to provide care on a full-time basis anyway.   
 
The Donnison Review 
Although the ICA and CB highlighted the issue of the need for social security to provide an 
independent income for women, the only time that the question of independent benefits as 
a general principle of the social security system was officially considered during the post-
war period was during the 1978 review of social assistance, chaired by David Donnison.  The 
   
aim of the Donnison review was to create 'clearer and more public rules based on simpler 
criteria covering the common and predictable needs...of claimants' (DHSS, 1978: 5).  The 
review was principally confined to Supplementary Benefit (SB), and it was accepted that the 
review team would not make any recommendations which would lead to a net increase in 
expenditure or staffing requirements (Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983: 113).  The review team 
considered, but subsequently ruled out, individual assessment 'on the grounds of expense 
and the unwarranted inequities of paying benefit to the partners of prosperous husbands or 
wives' (DHSS, 1978, para 11.7).  The grounds for this conclusion are unclear, given that ‘the 
1978 report did not calculate the actual cost of moving towards individual assessment of 
benefits; nor did it assess the extent to which partners in prosperous families would benefit 
from a such a change in practice’ (Esam and Berthoud, 1991: 5). Nonetheless, in 1979 the SB 
Commission concurred with the Donnison Review's conclusions:  
 
Benefit is paid for the claimant, his spouse and their dependent children, if they are 
living with him. This reflects the assumptions of the overwhelming majority of people 
in Britain. To change to a system where adults were means-tested individually would 
mean giving benefit to the wives of well-paid men without regard to their husbands' 
earnings. It would bring a great increase in the cost and the extent of means-testing; 
and the means test would become much more intrusive. (Supplementary Benefits 
Commission, 1979) 
 
The Fowler Review 
The 1985 Fowler Review (DHSS, 1985) was described by the government as a 
'comprehensive' review of the social security system although no thought was given to the 
specific implications for women of the Review's key objectives which were to target 
resources on those in greatest need, enhance self-reliance and independence, contain public 
expenditure, improve work incentives, and simplify the social security system. The Review 
was criticised by the Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) (1985) as having failed to 
address women's changed economic and social position since Beveridge and to consider 
their circumstances and needs (Lister, 1992: 31).  In fact, the unit of assessment did not even 
merit specific discussion (Lister, 1992), a remarkable silence given that work incentives 
were among the most important issues discussed in the 1980s and also that independent 
taxation was introduced in 1990 (Esam and Berthoud, 1991). 
   
The omission of any explicit consideration of the issue of independent assessment did not 
mean that the Review did not touch on the subject at all. It floated the idea of abolishing Child 
Benefit entirely and proposed to replace FIS with Family Credit, again, paid through the 
wallet. As Lewis (1991: 87) notes, 'the justifications for these changes were not too dissimilar 
from those underlying Ramsay MacDonald's objections to family allowances earlier in the 
century, namely that there was ‘no reason’ to suppose that working men would not provide 
for their wives and children'. However, by 1985 there was already plenty of evidence which 
gave reason to believe wives and children were not necessarily adequately provided for by 
their working or unemployed husbands. Several studies in the 1970s had revealed hidden 
pockets of family poverty caused by husbands' failures to pass on a share of their wages to 
their wives in the form of a housekeeping rise (Wilson, 1977: 80). Pahl (1980) and Vogler 
and Pahl (1993) showed that only one in five couples had the sort of joint pool that is 
assumed in the concept of family income, which underpins official poverty low income 
statistics and the principle of aggregation of couples’ resources in social security (see also 
Davies and Joshi 1994; Evason, 1991; McLaughlin 1999, 2000; Rake 2000). The gap between 
these assumptions and the realities of resource distribution within households means that, 
first, some family members may be in poverty, while others are not, and, second, that the 
depth of poverty for some members in poor households may be greater than for others. It 
also means that women are poorer than men: as Falkingham and Hills (1995) have shown 
using LIFEMOD, working on the assumption that households resources are equally shared, 
71 per cent of women were located in the bottom lifetime income group; when unequal 
sharing of resources is assumed, the proportion of women in the bottom lifetime income 
group rises to 81 per cent on the basis of 80 per cent of net income pooled, and to 88 per cent 
on the basis of 60 per cent of net income pooled. Furthermore, studies of divorced and 
separated women have shown that around a third of such women regard themselves as 
better off outside than inside marriage (Millar, 1996; McLaughlin, 1999).  
 
As Esam and Berthoud (1991) argue, although the Fowler Review did not explicitly refer to 
issues of aggregation and disaggregation, 
 
the division of benefits between men and women was more relevant to the Fowler 
plan than at first appeared.  It was important to the original conception of family 
credit as a nascent tax credit that it should be added to wage packets.  The money 
   
would almost always go the father.  However, the government eventually agreed to 
pay family credit direct to the mother, as the parent most likely to make use of it to 
meet the needs of their children.  The retention of child benefit, also paid to the 
mother, is another indication that assumptions about the sharing of income were not 
as 'overwhelmingly' held as the Supplementary Benefits Commission had claimed a 
decade earlier. (1991: 5)  
 
In similar vein, McLaughlin commented,   
 
the 1985 Green and White Papers on social security...stated that the social security 
system had to 'trust' men as breadwinners to distribute their income (either benefits 
or earnings) 'responsibly'. It is worth noting the use of the word 'responsibly' here, in 
preference to, say, equitably. This signifies the way the state, through the social 
security system, has not only relied on a particular family form (in design and 
administrative terms) but has also approved a specific kind of familial relationship: 
that it is a man's decision how much money his wife (or cohabitee) and children 
'need'. Thus the welfare of married women and children has been deemed to be the 
responsibility of individual men not the state. (1999: 181) 
 
A parliamentary answer from the then Prime Minister also points to a normative element in 
the assumption that the social security system can rightfully expect married (or cohabiting) 
couples to share their resources:  
 
all the income-related benefits including community charge benefit, follow the 
principle that couples share their income and capital resources, and their claims for 
benefits are assessed jointly. The Government believes that it is right for couples to 
share the responsibility of running their homes and paying their bills. (House of 
Commons Hansard, 1990, cited in Lister, 1992: 64)  
 
The 1990s and child support reform 
The liability, or responsibility, of family members to maintain one another was given a 
further lease of life by the 1991 Child Support Act, which attempted to create the male 
breadwinner family model even where parents with dependent children no longer live 
   
together (Pascall, 1997).  The government was concerned that separation and divorce should 
no longer be a mechanism by which fathers could pass on their duty to maintain their 
children to the taxpayer. The Act sought to strengthen the principle of family responsibility, 
a responsibility enforced by the Child Support Agency (CSA). Absent fathers are not only 
obliged under the Act to maintain their children - an obligation firmly rooted in centuries-
old common law - but also the mother(s), as the carer(s) of their children, irrespective of the 
parents’ marital status (Land 1994: 97).  While some championed the CSA as a significant 
measure to redistribute wealth in women's favour, others were sceptical about the wisdom 
of the restoration of financial dependence of both the mother and child(ren) on the male 
partner/husband. Moreover, greater priority, it seemed, was given over in the child support 
reforms to saving public expenditure than to improving the incomes and living conditions of 
women and children since no financial advantage was gained by women on Income Support 
as a result of co-operating with the CSA.  The degree of control over, and intrusion into, men 
and women's sexual and personal relations associated with the Act and Agency was 
unprecedented in British history.  In this respect, resource transfers between parents, 
formerly considered a 'private' matter in social security and an impediment to the 
introduction of individual assessments became a public matter, and the subject of state 
regulation.  
 
The 1990s and the Commission on Social Justice 
The backdrop of growing reliance on means-testing during the post-war period was 
considered at some length by the Commission on Social Justice (1994).  The Commission 
argued in favour of individualising social security entitlements on the grounds that ‘the more 
the benefits system recognises women as individuals, the more it will encourage partners to 
stay together [i.e. by removing the disincentives for couples in receipt of means-tested 
benefits to live together], as well as tackle poverty and increase personal autonomy’ (1994: 
249). The Commission favoured a strategy of extending the role of social insurance rather 
than the alternative of disaggregating means-tested benefits as the means of individualising 
social security. The disaggregation of means-tested benefits for the purposes of calculation 
of eligibility and payment would, it argued, both undermine the purpose of means-testing 
and further extend state intrusion into personal affairs (ibid.). On the other hand, social 
insurance benefits already embody individual entitlements and do not create the kinds of 
work and savings disincentives inherent within means-tested benefits. However, the 
   
Commission was also clear that a strategy to revitalise social insurance should adopt a 
different approach to families, recognising family responsibilities which affect in particular 
women's ability to take up paid employment and consequently their lifetime incomes. 
Consequently, it proposed ‘a modernised social insurance system, designed to help 
unemployed people to take employment, and to enable parents and carers to fulfil family 
responsibilities without risking future security’ (1994: 302). The details of those proposals 
are presented in Chapter Six. In the following discussion we present some data illustrating 
the outcomes of this history for women’s personal incomes and their receipt of social 
security benefits. 
 
The personal incomes of men and women in the UK 
People have, or potentially have, several sources of personal income: 
 
(i) Market income, which has two principle sub-divisions - earned income and 
unearned income from assets such as savings, shares, housing property, 
ownership of means of production, etc.; 
 
(ii) Social income from fiscal transfers through the tax/benefit system; 
 
(iii) Familial income, such as shares of the income of someone else in their family 
or household (including ex-spouses). Beyond a general mutual duty of 
financial support, however, members of families in Britain as in Ireland do not 
have enforceable rights to shares in the incomes of the ‘head of household’ or 
other members. This contrasts with the explicit financial obligations of absent 
fathers, although all developed societies have been singularly unsuccessful at 
enforcing the principle of transfer of substantial resources from absent 
fathers to lone mothers with the care of children. 
 
As regards Britain, Esam and Berthoud (1991) calculated that 4.6 million women in 
Britain in 1991/2 had independent incomes from the first two of the income sources 
above of less than £25 a week compared with only 0.4 million men.   
 
   
It has traditionally been held to be one of the functions of social security and taxation 
systems to mediate through transfers the impact of differential or earned income 
between social groups - principally between social classes. (The other principle function 
is the redistribution of income over one’s own life course). However, the extent to which 
Western social security systems perform this mediating function as between the incomes 
of women and men has been poor. As table 2.1 shows, women in the UK in 1998/1999 
on average received £174 less per week from market sources than men, but only £9 a 
week more through the social security system. The remaining gap of £165 a week was 
only marginally (£5 a week) offset by women’s greater receipt of income from other 
sources - for example, maintenance from ex-spouses. 
 
Table 2.1  Individual income 1998/9 (average gross weekly individual income of 
people aged 16 or over) Great Britain 
 
 Women Men 
 £ per week % of total 
income 
£ per week % of total 
income 
Source of income     
Earnings 
 
103     61 221   67 
Self employment 
 
    8     5   40   12 
Occupational 
pensions 
 
    8     5   26     8 
Investment 
 
    8     5   14     4 
Sub total 
 
127   301 90 
Benefit income 
(including state 
pension) 
 
  36   21   27     8 
Other  income     5     3     5     2 
 
Total income 169 100 332 100 
 
   Source: DSS Analytical Services Division, in EOC 2001       
   
 
Trewsdale et al (1999) and McLaughlin et al (1999), using Northern Ireland Labour 
Force Survey data, showed the extent of earnings inequality between working-age men 
and women. At £102.00 the average (mean) weekly income for women was merely 61 
per cent of that of males (£166.63); using the median, the average weekly income for 
women was 58.4 per cent of that of men (Trewsdale et al: 1999). These inequalities in 
market income are reproduced in the amounts of weekly benefit income of men and 
women. Although the average amount of weekly benefit received by those in 
employment was slightly higher for men than for women (by about £5), the average 
amount received by the unemployed was 66.5 per cent per week greater for men than 
for women, while the average amount received by the economically-inactive group was 
63 per cent greater for men than for women (see table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2  Weekly benefit income: working-age only by economic activity by sex, 
1994, Northern Ireland  
 
Sex Economic 
groups 
N £ mean £ 
median 
£ range 
Male Employee 82 32.53 26.20 133.20 
 Unemployed 31
2 
65.69 45.00 272.85 
 Inactive 32
2 
90.03 87.75 241.50 
Female Employee 56
4 
27.18 18.10 133.52 
 Unemployed 10
6 
43.71 41.75 112.85 
 Inactive 80
7 
56.46 45.95 215.10 
Source: Trewsdale et al 1999 table 3.6, p. 21 
 
As regards women's personal incomes, the research showed that half of working-age 
women in Northern Ireland in 1994 had gross incomes below £73.10, and women's 
median incomes were 58.4 per cent of those of men (McLaughlin et al, 1999: 22). They 
further show that 15 per cent of women had no income whatsoever; a further 5 per cent 
had incomes of between £1 and £17; nearly two-fifths - 39 per cent of women of working 
   
age in Northern Ireland in 1994 had incomes of £45.70 or less per week, and over half - 
51.6 per cent - had income of £76.50 a week or less. They conclude that ‘nearly half the 
working-age female population in Northern Ireland had personal incomes below the 
levels the social security system defines as essential’ (ibid: 23). 
 
Of course, these figures provide only a crude estimate of the extent to which the social 
security system ‘makes up for’ differences in market incomes between men and women, 
since it takes all ages of adult men and women at a single point in time. A more 
sophisticated approach, in terms of evaluating the impact of a social security system, or 
a welfare system generally, is to control for the historical effects of, on the one hand, 
market change over time and, on the other, welfare change over time, by analysing the 
effect of the welfare system on a single age cohort over their whole life course (though 
this inevitably means that assumptions of a stable future have to be made and that the 
results are not generalisable to the total population).  This was the approach taken by a 
team within the Welfare State Programme at the STICERD, London School of Economics, 
which, using a microsimulation model called LIFEMOD, analysed the effects of the UK 
welfare system on lifetime incomes and standards of living for a hypothetical cohort of 
men and women born in 1985 (see Falkingham and Hills 1995).  
 
As they pointed out, the British welfare state achieves both inter- and intra- personal 
redistribution, but with the latter being on a larger scale. As it was structured in 1985, 
between two-thirds and three-quarters of gross lifetime benefits were self-financed 
(Evandrou and Falkingham 1995: 182). Nevertheless there was significant inter-
personal distribution.  The lifetime poor are generally the net gainers from the inter-
personal redistribution that does occur and the lifetime rich the net losers. Further, 
women are net gainers from the system and men are net losers (ibid: 147). Evandrou 
and Falkingham conclude that men’s lifetime original market-derived income is almost 
twice that of women’s but that the tax and social security system, as it operated in 1985, 
made a substantial contribution to reducing inequality between men and women. They 
calculate that the tax and social security systems made a net average lifetime transfer 
from men to women of between £40,000 and £50,000 (ibid: 144), reducing the ratio 
between men’s and women’s net income to 1.4 (ibid: 182). A considerable part of the 
gain made by women is attributable to their greater longevity and to the payment of 
   
means-tested income supplements to retired women without either a full state 
retirement pension or an occupational pension.  However, the degree of income transfer 
between men and women achieved by the tax/benefit system during the period of 
working-age is in comparison very small indeed, with substantial consequences for 
working-age women in terms of social inclusion, citizenship and autonomy. Importantly, 
Evandrou and Falkingham also point out that changes to tax and social security between 
1985 and 1991 have acted to reduce the scale of redistribution generally, and 
particularly that between men and women.  The changes over this period have meant 
that the average net lifetime transfer between men and women will have fallen by about 
20 per cent (or between £8,000 and £10,000 at 1985 prices) (ibid: 147). 
 
Units of assessment since 1997  
Any expectation that unit of assessment issues would be addressed by the Labour 
government as part of its radical reform of the social security system proved premature. 
During its first term in office, the Labour Government's priorities for social security lay 
with getting working-age economically inactive people (disabled, lone parents, 
unemployed) into paid employment. Neither of its key policy documents, A New Contract 
for Welfare (1998) and Women and Social Security (1998), which underpinned this 
strategy, addressed how women's access to an independent benefit income could be 
enhanced, although the latter of these seemed to promise that unit of assessment issues 
might be addressed (see McLaughlin et al, 1999):   
 
in order to understand the needs of both men and women, we need to understand 
the way in which the real differences that exist between the lives of men and the 
lives of women impact on their relationship with the social security system. (DSS 
1998: 2).  
 
Thus while Women and Social Security noted that women of working age are less likely than 
men to qualify for contributory benefits due to their low earnings, it avoided how this 
‘entitlement deficit’ could be addressed, instead focusing on maternity pay and the raising of 
the lower earnings threshold for national insurance benefits. It also acknowledged that 
benefits are still usually paid to the man (unless there are exceptional circumstances, such 
as where he cannot manage the family budget due to alcoholism) and stated the government 
   
was looking into 'whether more should be done to recognise the role of women, who usually 
manages the family budget, and to pay money for her and the children directly to her' (1998: 
20). Given the relative decline of the contributory system and the increasing reliance on 
means-tested benefits and tax credits, both of which use the household as unit of assessment, 
any measures the government introduces are not likely to deviate from the aggregation 
principle. This method of individualisation is very limited and the experience from Ireland 
and the Netherlands, where it has already been introduced on an elective basis, suggests that 
only a very small proportion of couples utilise this facility (see Chapters Five and Six).  
 
Such an attempt to attenuate the impact of aggregation can be appreciated as being 
particularly limited when set against the government's emphasis on (workless) households 
and its preoccupation with men's work incentives (McLaughlin et al, 2001). The principal 
measures introduced by the government as they pertain to unit of assessment issues - 
Working Families Tax Credit, Childcare Tax Credits, Children's Tax Credit and the Joint 
Claims procedure - are summarised in Appendix 1.  The WFTC in particular has attracted 
much commentary and criticism for the way that its greater 'generosity' towards low-income 
working families has both extended the practice of means-testing up the income scale and 
levered the resources into the household via the male wallet rather than the female purse 
(McLaughlin et al, 2001). Dean (2001) suggests that one effect of the tax credits will be to 
increase the number of households supported by ‘means-tested benefits’ from 24 per cent in 
1999 to 38 per cent by 2003. This undoubtedly transforms the political importance of, and 
therefore heightens sensitivities to, any attempt to individualise social security benefits 
while at the same time increasing the need for reform. The re-introduction of the principle 
of aggregation into the taxation system via the new tax credits sits uneasily with the trend 
towards individual assessment of taxation in the UK and internationally over the last twenty 
years.   
 
A traditionalist policy preoccupation with households is also evident in the Joint Claims 
procedure. This formally re-establishes the link between women's social security 
entitlements (and their participation in employment programme) and the entitlements and 
status of their unemployed male partner. Since March 2001 the Joint Claims Procedure has 
been applied to couples claiming IBJSA where at least one of the partners is under 25 and 
neither of whom are caring for a dependent child. Its extension to partners aged under 45 
   
years in 2002 will herald the further extension of the principle of aggregation in the social 
security system for those who are unemployed. Seen together with the decline of national 
insurance, these new provisions for most unemployed couples and for low-income working 
couples mark a substantial shift towards the use of the principle of aggregation in the UK 
fiscal system, a shift which all evidence suggests will have profoundly negative consequences 
for women's access to an independent income, and probably for family life itself.  
 
Summary  
This chapter has reviewed the history of policy thinking, debate and practice around issues 
of aggregation and disaggregation in the UK social security system during the post-WWII 
period. During this time, indeed throughout the twentieth century, governments of both 
political persuasions have regarded it the responsibility of men partners to financially 
support their wives and child(ren), institutionalised wives’ and mothers’ dependency on 
their male partners and channeled the most valuable fiscal supports towards the wallet 
rather than the purse. This has not been uncontested and we highlighted that, despite the 
overall trend towards aggregation, issues of women's economic independence have been the 
focus of various campaigns throughout the twentieth century. Moreover, there has been a 
degree of recognition within government that the benefit unit, particularly the issue of to 
whom the benefit is paid, is an important consideration in any policy response to poverty, 
particularly child poverty. In the following chapter we consider in some detail arguments in 
favour of extending the principle of disaggregation in the social security system.  
 
 
   
CHAPTER THREE 
 
INDIVIDUALISATION: THEORETICAL AND POLICY CONCERNS 
 
This chapter examines why individualisation and issues of economic independence have 
begun to make their way into mainstream policy agendas, as they have done in a number 
of countries. The discussion looks at both theoretical concerns and the policy drivers of 
labour supply, family formation and social exclusion/inclusion. It begins by clarifying 
what is meant by both individualisation and economic independence. 
 
Individualisation 
The term individualisation refers to a reform agenda in which systems of social security 
move further towards a basis of individual entitlements - i.e. social security benefits and 
taxation are based on individual assessment of personal income and are paid to the 
individual. Sainsbury (1996: 174) defines individualisation as those 'changes in 
legislation which make the individual the unit of entitlement and obligations 
(contributions and taxes) rather than the family or household', while Quiesser (2000: 
65) defines it as 'the tendency...to take only the individual into consideration - rather 
than the head of the household or the entitled family member - for the granting of rights 
to benefits and the calculation of the amount of benefits'. Although individualisation is 
most often discussed in the context of social security and taxation it is also relevant to 
occupational welfare (pensions and health care).   
 
Sainsbury (1994, 1996) has usefully distinguished between 'breadwinner' and 
'individual' models of welfare. As noted above, individualisation implies a shift from a 
breadwinner model of welfare premised on derived rights for women and personal 
rights for men, to an individual model of welfare embodying individual, or personal 
rights for both women and men (Table 3.1). Under the breadwinner model entitlement 
is based on breadwinner status and the principle of maintenance where wives' (or 
partners') entitlements to benefits are derived from their status as dependants within 
the family and from their husbands' entitlements. Under the individual model, 
individuals have personal entitlements; each partner is responsible for his or her own 
   
maintenance, there are no deductions or allowances for dependants, and each partner 
shares the tasks of financial support and care of their children (Sainsbury, 1994).  
 
Table 3.1 Dimensions of variation of the breadwinner and the individual models 
of social policy  
 
Dimension Breadwinner model Individual model 
Familial ideology Strict division of labour 
Husband = earner 
Wife = carer 
Shared roles 
Husband = 
earner/carer 
Wife = earner/carer 
Entitlement  Differentiated among 
spouses 
Uniform  
Basis of entitlement Breadwinner  Other 
Recipient of 
benefits 
Head of household  Individual  
Unit of benefit Household or family  Individual  
Unit of 
contributions 
Household  Individual  
Taxation Joint taxation 
Deductions for 
dependants 
Separate taxation 
Equal tax relief 
Employment and 
wage policies 
Priority to men  Aimed at both sexes 
Sphere of care  Primarily private Strong state 
involvement 
Caring work  Unpaid Paid component 
Source: Sainsbury (1994) table 10.1.  
 
It is important to note that these are 'ideal types', and that, as noted in Chapter One, social 
security systems actually contain elements of both (see also Chapter Four). The 
increasingly muddled mix of bases of assessment and entitlement adds confusion to 
already complex tax/benefit systems in developed countries and appears increasingly 
out of step with social attitudes regarding the appropriateness of different kinds of 
obligations between individuals tied by blood or custom.  
 
   
Insofar as individualisation aims to reduce the extent to which husbands and wives, male 
and female cohabitees, look to each other (or more precisely, the extent to which women 
look to their male partners) for a minimum income (Esam and Berthoud, 1991: 5), it runs 
counter to the traditionalistic policy 'logic' of the UK’s social security, tax and 
employment systems which have historically been premised on women's dependency 
on their male partners or husbands rather than the state for their economic security (see 
Chapter Two). Individualisation links into current policy concerns about labour supply, 
family formation, equality and inclusion; it raises fundamental questions about the 
nature of welfare regimes; it involves questions of principle, structure and ideology, not 
just of administration, and in a broad range of social policies (employment, care). These 
issues are considered in more detail below.  
 
It is worth distinguishing between individualisation in the sense that we refer to it from 
two other meanings that are often attributed to it. First, individualisation is a term 
sometimes used to refer to the extension of individual choice in matters pertaining to 
social protection. This involves making individuals responsible for choosing their 
insurance organisation, the insurance formula or and deciding whether they wish to be 
insured. Individualisation as the extension of individual choice is related to, but does not 
necessarily lead to, the individualisation of rights or the privatisation of social protection 
(Quiesser, 2000: 65).  
 
Second, the policy reform agenda of individualisation has been contemporaneous with 
what many people describe (negatively) as a rise in materialistic excessive individualism 
since the end of the Second World War. For example, a notable issue in submissions to 
the Irish Commission on the Family (1997) was the belief that there had been a rise in 
individualism in Irish society, exemplified by a materialistic consumerism, a lack of 
regard for other people’s rights or for personal responsibilities. The Commission 
commented that “numerous submissions observed that increased individualism may 
lead to fracturing of the family bond (or family solidarity in continental European terms).  
A common view was that the collective requirements necessarily supersede individual 
autonomy” (1996: 54).  However, excessive individualism is not the necessary outcome 
of individualisation of national institutional arrangements; indeed it would not be so 
since it has developed independently of such arrangements.  It is to be attributed more 
   
to the cultural impact of modern capitalism and the privatisation of consumption and 
leisure caused by rising standards of living.  Indeed many commentators believe that 
individualism within welfare institutional arrangements is more family-friendly than the 
reverse (see, for example, Saraceno, 2001).  Certainly there is some empirical evidence 
that interdependency is best protected and encouraged when it is entered into by the 
choice of otherwise independent and autonomous individuals.   
 
The discussion returns to the issue of autonomy later, but for now it is worth re-stating 
that individualisation within fiscal systems should not be seen as coterminous with 
either the enhancement of individual choice as to which social protection provisions to 
consume or the cultural phenomenon of individualism. Indeed many of those arguing for 
greater individualisation do so because they believe this enhances social solidarity, 
and/or because it encourages the formation and maintenance of important social bonds 
- those between spouses, or those involved in other long-term intimate adult 
relationships, and between parents and children - and that it does so because it removes 
some of the practice and fear of possibilities of abuses which can arise in such intimate 
relationships. In other words, the focus of these arguments is not on material 
gratification but rather on the ways that material, or economic, relations of dependence 
can threaten the social life of a community or nation through the insecurities and abuses 
experienced by ‘dependants’ or potential dependants. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the question ‘why individualise fiscal systems?’ is the 
same as the question ‘is economic independence a good thing?’  Dependence and 
independence are ‘loaded’ terms when used in everyday discourse.  However, what 
counts as dependence and independence, and whether that dependence/independence 
is negative or positive, has differed in terms of what types of incomes are involved and 
who the subject is. Thus, market-derived income is thought of as bestowing 
independence’ while publicly-redistributed income may be thought of as indicating 
‘dependency’ in some cases but not all (e g. retired pensioners are not usually depicted 
as caught up in ‘welfare dependency’, whereas those on unemployment assistance are).  
The difference here is partly to do with whether it is a portion or all of a person’s income 
which is derived from tax/benefit system, and partly to do with the division between 
universal and some social insurance benefits on the one hand, and other social insurance 
   
benefits and means-tested benefits on the other. This distinction represents a division 
between those social groups who are believed to be legitimately under no obligation to 
derive a considerable proportion of their income from the market and those who are 
believed to have such an obligation. 
 
Meanwhile, reliance on the incomes of others within households or families is thought 
of as a negative dependence if it involves the husband deriving income from his wife, but 
if it involves the wife/female partner and/or children relying on income from the male 
breadwinner, it is more variably regarded.  To some, this reliance is not ‘dependence’ in 
a negative sense. On the other hand, cultural images of the wife (or ex-wife) ‘bleeding the 
husband dry’ and of the 'gold digger’, together with many women’s discomfiture at 
having to negotiate the goodwill of their partner in order to meet their basic needs, 
suggest this ‘dependence’ is not uniformly regarded as a ‘good’ dependence. 
 
The variability with which the dependence of many wives/co-habitees is regarded stems 
from the failure of modern society to attribute equal value to that which is traditionally 
exchanged between men and women within marital partnerships. Reciprocity is the 
basis of social relations within households and extended families, as well as within wider 
communities. Yet for all the designations of marriage as ‘partnership’, few people regard 
the contribution of the woman’s domestic and caring labour as equivalent to the man’s 
contribution from paid work; something which is very evident when marital 
relationships break down. Nor have public systems of redistribution attempted to value 
domestic and caring labour. As a result, the exchange, or reciprocity, involved is weak, 
causing married women to be seen as, and to feel, dependent in a negative sense on their 
husbands. 
 
At the heart of such negative dependency is the reality that, as Robert Goodin put it, 
‘depending on their families for assistance subjects beneficiaries to the arbitrary will of 
another’ (1985: 37). Such dependency differs fundamentally from that involved in total 
reliance on the social welfare system for income, since in the latter case, one is not 
subject to the arbitrary will of another person. For this reason, economic dependence 
within families erodes the citizenship and freedom of ‘dependents’ in a way that 
dependence on social welfare does not: ‘The lack of security, rights and autonomy 
   
involved in a personal relationship of economic dependency and the sense of deference 
it can create are corrosive of any notion of citizenship rights’ (Lister, 1993). The 
interdependence of ‘the three-legged stool’ of civil, political and social rights cannot be 
discussed here in any detail; suffice it here to note that ‘the principle of self-ownership 
is of little use until it is joined with a principle of rights over material resources’ (Ingram, 
1995: 45). The role of any redistributive income system should be to promote autonomy 
and reduce dependency on the arbitrary will of others in the interests of freedom, and 
thereby to ‘encourage and promote the involvement of every person in the social, 
economic, political and cultural life of the society’ (Healy and Reynolds. 1995: 31).  In 
theoretical terms, then, the issue of economic independence is inseparable from concern 
with autonomy, justice, freedom and human rights. In addition, some argue for increased 
individualisation of fiscal instruments on the grounds that the accompanying 
simplification and reduction of state surveillance are themselves important means of 
increasing freedom for all: ‘simplification means benefit amounts that are crystal clear, 
regulations that match the lives [people] live and allow them to fulfill their aspirations, 
ease of access, low compliance costs, the minimum of intrusion and continuity’ (Parker, 
1995: 93).  We, too, take the view that individual citizens are ‘better’ than their 
governments at both judging what is best for them and at adapting to macro change. 
Moral, political and economic justifications for reforms to individualisation in fiscal 
systems  
 
In this section the outcomes of the above history in terms of men’s and women’s personal 
incomes are reviewed and the main policy drivers behind public discussion of 
individualisation at the international as well as national levels are outlined. 
 
A question of justice, or ‘No taxation without representation’: gender equality and 
social security provision    
 
A problem in most social insurance systems since the second world war is that rises in 
women’s participation in employment have led to women contributing increased shares 
of revenue but failing to benefit from corresponding increases in entitlement. Indeed in 
many countries, contributions generally have risen but individuals’ access to insurance 
benefits has become more tightly controlled as eligibility rules have tightened, especially 
   
for unemployment benefits. The UK is probably one of the most acute examples. During 
the last two decades, successive Conservative administrations have restricted 
entitlements to national insurance systems with the explicit aim of achieving a shift 
towards means-tested benefits, and they have increased the level of national insurance 
contributions paid by the population in general.  Simultaneously, women’s employment 
rates have increased and the ‘small stamp’ - married women’s reduced contributions – 
has been largely phased out. So, as Table 3.2 shows, in 1990 women were 42 per cent of 
those paying contributions but in no case were they 42 per cent of the recipients of 
national insurance benefits.  The reasons for this inequity are well known: the failure to 
alter the definitions of availability for work and work itself to accommodate the ‘flexible’ 
patterns of employment engaged in by women, and the failure to enlarge the scope of the 
social insurance system to ‘capture’ risks commonly experienced by women, so that 
women are more likely than men to pay wasted’ contributions. In addition, the EC Equal 
Treatment Directive did not apply to statutory survivors’ benefits and pensions so that 
women’s contributions still do not earn for their partners the right to widow(er)s’ 
benefits or retirement pensions. This anomaly was finally rectified in 2001 through the 
introduction of new bereavement benefits in the UK. Thus, despite greatly increased 
contributions to public revenues in general (contributions and personal income 
taxation), the UK social security system has achieved rather less by way of compensation 
to women for low incomes or income loss, a topic explored further below.  In general, the 
failure of social insurance systems to adapt to changing social and economic 
circumstances and to present incomplete gender equality, exemplified by their failure to 
adapt to meeting women’s income needs, risks the danger of a falling away of support 
for European welfare systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 3.2  Women and the National Insurance system, Great Britain, 1970, 1990, 
and 2000 
 
 
Contributors          
   
1970 1990 2000 
% of working wives paying reduced 
contributions  
76 14 N/A 
% women workers paying standard 
contributions                    
50 91 98* 
Women as % of employed workers paying 
standard contributions                                                  
22 42 44* 
         
Beneficiaries: women as % of recipients 
 
   
Industrial Disablement Benefit                                                       9   11 18** 
Invalidity Benefit/Incapacity Benefit                                         20 24 33 
Sickness Benefit                                                                     22 32  
Unemployment Benefit                                                          14 28 30 
Retirement Pension (claimed on own, not 
husband’s insurance record 
41 37*** 44 
 
Note: * at 1997; ** at 1998; *** figures 1970 and 1990 are not comparable because of a 
1978 reclassification from own insurance to husbands’ in cases where wives’ pensions 
were topped up under new rules of the 1975 Social Security Pensions Act. 
Source: derived from: Sainsbury, 1994 Table 8.3, p. 181. CSO (2001) Annual Abstract & 
Statistics, London: HMSO.  CSO (1998) Labour Force Survey, London: HMSO. 
 
 
Europe and gender equality 
The individualisation of social security rights has been a recurrent theme in recent years 
in European Commission policy. The legal basis for EC policy pronouncements on this 
issue is equality legislation (79/7 Equal Treatment in state social security schemes, later 
extended to occupational schemes by Directive 86/37). Active EU policy on 
individualisation can be traced to the late 1980s, also a period of relative activism for the 
EU in social policy. Perhaps the most important statement of the Commission's concerns 
can be found in the Draft Council Directive completing the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment of men and women in statutory and occupational social 
   
security: COM 87 494 extended the principle of equal treatment to survivors’ pensions 
and family benefits, and provided for the equalisation of pension ages. The Directive's 
explanatory memorandum states that its aim is 'to promote individual entitlement as an 
alternative to the extension of derived rights'. The Directive would essentially allow 
member states to replace derived rights with individual rights in certain branches of 
social security (e.g. medical care, old age pensions and survivors' benefits). As Sohrab 
(2000: 108) argues: 'the original proposal was that member States should promote the 
individualisation of entitlements, and particular derived rights, such as survivors' 
benefits or dependants' additions, should be equalised between men and women'. When, 
in 1989, negotiations began on this proposal, substantial revisions were made 'including 
the removal of all traces of references to individualisation, as was the option offered to 
Member States to abolish derived entitlements' (ibid). The Directive has been 'pending' 
since then, 'and it is understood that officials within the European Commission believe 
that the entire idea of individualisation needs to be rethought, and that any additional 
proposal must be advanced in a different form' (ibid).  
 
Notwithstanding the problems this Directive has encountered, many references, direct 
and indirect, to individualisation can be found in EC policy documents. Chapter eight of 
the White Paper (1993) Growth, Competitiveness and Employment states that the EC’s 
objective is 'to reinforce practices that favour equal opportunities for men and women'; 
this should entail 'eliminating any potentially discriminatory fiscal and social protection 
policies which can discourage women's equal participation in the formal labour market' 
and ensure that 'taxation and social security systems reflect the fact that women and men 
may well act as individuals in seeking employment and reconciling work and family life'. 
Individualisation has been included in the second (1986-90), third (1991-95) and fourth 
(1996-2000) Equal Opportunities programmes. In addition, two objectives of the 1997 
Communication on modernising and improving social protection were relevant to 
individualisation: making social protection more employment-friendly, and adjusting to 
the new gender balance in working life. In the Employment Guidelines, the European 
Commission pledged to 'focus in particular on making tax and benefit systems more 
employment-friendly' and to 'present a proposal in 1999 to update and complete the 
legislative framework for equal treatment in social security schemes between women 
and men' (CEC (1998: 15)  
   
 
The EC's approach essentially stems from a concern with the principle of non-
discrimination, both direct and indirect, a principle that has guided EU social policy more 
generally. Specifically, the Commission's concerns are with the ways in, and the extent 
to, which derived rights, by creating high marginal tax rates for married (and cohabiting) 
women, are a cause of indirect sex discrimination in access to employment (Peemans-
Poullet, 2000). (It should however be noted that the attribution of dependants' rights as 
the determinant factor of female labour supply is contested. McLaughlin et al (1999) for 
example have stressed the importance of social and not just financial incentives to take 
up employment).  Furthermore, the nature of the EU necessarily means that the 
Commission's concerns have to be with the relationship between individualisation and 
labour market participation and equality of opportunity therein (hence it is concerned 
with 'equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and 
treatment at work', Agreement on Social Policy, article 2, Treaty on European Union). Its 
workerist orientation means that women's economic independence is conceived of as an 
outcome of equal access (non-discrimination) to employment. Thus, the most recent 
(Fourth) Equal Opportunities programme highlighted the individualisation of social 
security and tax as a strategy to reduce employment discrimination and ensure women's 
independence (Peemans-Poullet, 2000: 45).      
 
International labour supply concerns 
At the international level, the OECD’s and the ILO’s interest in individualisation lies 
principally with labour supply concerns and with the gender division of paid and unpaid 
labour. The OECD has recognised that  
 
Policies based on the sole breadwinner two-adult family - such as joint income 
testing for social security benefits and dependent spouse allowances - have 
disincentive effects on women's employment and men's ability to play a greater 
role in family care. (OECD, 1991: 10, cited in Cousins, 19:66)   
 
The ILO's (2000) focus on income security recognises women's unequal access to social 
security as well as to employment; it regards women's unequal access to social/income 
security as a reflection of labour market inequalities but also recognises the influence of 
   
social security systems in perpetuating women's inequality in employment. It attributes 
gender inequality in social security and in paid employment to the unequal division of 
labour more generally. The ILO also recognises the necessity of reconstructing gender 
relations in realising greater social security for women as the following extract shows: 
 
 Improved income security for women presupposes some or all of the following 
measures:  
§ greater equality between women and men in the home and in the labour 
market; 
§ practical measures that help men and women combine paid employment 
and caring work and that support the access of women to paid work; 
§ the extension of compulsory social security to all employees, including the 
particular categories in which women are heavily represented; 
§ the recognition of unpaid caring work through the award of credits under 
contributory systems or through the provision of universal benefits; 
§ the elimination of schemes which directly or indirectly discriminate against 
women (or at any rate a reduced role for such schemes); 
§ a careful and gradual transition process if and when gender equality leads 
to cutbacks in benefits for women.  (ILO, 2000: 229).  
 
Many commentators have noted that fiscal and social security measures can have a 
positive, negative or neutral effect on the level of supply of women’s labour. In general, 
as the OECD note, means-tested benefit systems are negative because they involve joint 
income-testing, with the result that mothers in two-parent households are particularly 
sensitive to marginal tax rates (the combined effects of personal income taxation and 
social security benefit entitlements), and that they are much more sensitive, or ‘rational’, 
than men.   Fiscal measures may also affect the nature of labour supply, skewing it 
towards particular forms of paid work such as self-employment, casual or part-time 
employment, though this will be as much affected by the nature of employment 
protection legislation. 
 
The labour market effects of means-tested income assistance are not confined to its 
immediate effects on married women/mothers. The negative impact on these women’s 
   
labour supply in turn affects the nature of their male partner’s labour supply. With 
female partners not in paid work, or with very low earnings, the labour supply of the 
male must be turned towards full-time, permanent work, reducing his ability to access 
other forms of earned market income, something which has been of increasing concern 
in countries such as the UK, where nearly half of vacancies are not of the full-time, 
permanent, form. 
 
As the recent Treasury Full Employment Paper (HM Treasury, 2001) notes, there 
remains an enduring divide between work-rich and work-poor households in Britain.  
This issue first came to policy attention in the mid 1990s.  It is an issue of central 
importance to the Government’s social exclusion/inclusion and welfare-to-work 
agendas.  Less progress has been made in reducing the extent of work-poor households 
than in reducing unemployment per se, signifying that economic inactivity rates among 
women in such households need to become a focus of policy attention just as much as 
male unemployment has been.  Thus, in the UK context the time is right for the spotlight 
of social security policy development to shine on the partners of claimants, a group 
previously over-shadowed by claimants. 
 
The possibilities for reducing the negative effects of means-tested income assistance on 
labour supply are, however, limited. There are intractable technical problems in setting 
the so-called marginal tax rate or ‘withdrawal rate’ in means-tested benefits. Provided 
break-even points are not too high, universal and social insurance benefits, to which 
entitlement is largely assessed on an individual basis, score higher on economic 
efficiency ratings than means-tested benefits, because they sharpen, as well as simplify, 
incentives. Replacing child additions to means-tested support for unemployed people 
with larger universal child benefits (as a 1994 ESRI study proposed), for instance, very 
considerably erodes unemployment traps since the latter mainly affect parents with 
several children. When marginal tax rates are lowered, in order to encourage labour 
supply, benefit entitlement has to be ‘needlessly’ extended to large numbers of people 
above whatever poverty line is in use. In Britain, it has been estimated that to reduce 
marginal tax rates to a point where the labour supply of female partners of unemployed 
men is noticeably enhanced, would require the extension of means-tested benefits (in 
this case, Working Families Tax Credit) to at least half of all families with children. 
   
Household formation and composition 
This is an issue which has become important for several reasons. First, there have been 
rapid rises in the proportion of families headed by lone mothers in recent years, 
particularly in urban areas. Second, as noted previously, about two-thirds of divorces in 
Britain are initiated by women, with nearly half citing violence or other unreasonable 
behaviour (e.g. the withholding of financial resources) as the reason why divorce is 
sought. In addition, substantial rises in labour market participation rates among married 
women in countries with traditionally low rates (e.g. Ireland) suggest that women are 
increasingly finding the prospect of independent earned incomes attractive. 
Accompanying fertility declines have become a concern in other European countries. 
Here it is noteworthy that only Norway and Sweden - both countries with strongly 
inclusive social security systems and social policies facilitating motherhood - have 
experienced recent small rises in fertility, back to, or just above, replacement levels. The 
role of fiscal systems in encouraging child rearing is one which, as McLaughlin argued in 
1996, is as fundamental to societal sustainability as the effect of fiscal systems on 
economic competitiveness and growth. 
 
The other impetus to thinking about individualisation has focused on family equity and 
the impact of financial arrangements (specifically patterns of economic dependence and 
independence) on the formation and maintenance of familial relationships and fertility 
levels. Concerns include: whether the treatment of young adults as dependents on their 
parents encourages, rather than discourages, young adults to leave the parental home; 
whether the treatment of mothers/wives as dependents on their male partners 
encourages, rather than discourages, relationship breakdown and hence lone 
motherhood, and similarly, whether this treatment discourages young women from 
entering long-term cohabiting and marital relationships; and whether an absence of 
independent incomes for mothers at home full-time discourages fertility as women 
search for independent income through the market and reduce their fertility to 
accommodate this. This is a poorly researched area, compared with that of labour supply, 
and rigorous evidence is hard to come by.  
 
Hobson and Takahashi (2001) have recently discussed these issues in terms of the 
significance of voice and exit within egalitarian gender familial relationships.  That is to 
   
say, economic dependency between adult heterosexual couples may reduce the voice of 
the women involved so much that they come to prefer exit from, or choose not to enter 
into, such partnerships.  There is some empirical evidence to support such 
interpretations of macro-social and -demographic change (Saraceno 2001).  This could 
also be described as an informal rejection of familism by the younger generations of 
today’s women.  Although much of such discussion is either ideological or theoretical 
rather than evidence-driven, it seems unlikely that choice of reform direction towards 
(i) decreasing familism in social security; (ii) increasing women’s voices within couples 
and families and (iii) thus reducing the ‘incentives’ towards exit would be reform in an 
erroneous direction from the point of view of support for the families. 
 
Although the empirical evidence is now very dated it is helpful to recall the Negative 
Income Tax experiments of the 1970s in the United States. These suggested that although 
family-based income and means assessment appear, to governments at least, to be better 
‘targeted’ (cost-effective) than systems of universal or social insurance benefits and 
separate income taxation, in fact family income assessment both contributed to reduced 
labour market participation (as noted above) and increased family break-up. For 
example, the Seattle-Denver NIT experiment showed that marital dissolution rates had 
increased by over 40 per cent and an estimated 12,000 new family units had been 
created out of the original 4,800 units (SRI International, 1983). So although it may 
appear paradoxical, individual assessment for tax and social security benefits appears to 
be both more family-friendly and work-friendly than assessment based on couples, 
households or families; it is also less vulnerable to fraud, which is a major problem in the 
US’ EITC and may become so in the UK’s WFTC and subsequent tax credits. 
 
Social inclusion/exclusion 
Poverty worldwide is clearly concentrated amongst women and children. In the West 
generally this is largely the effect of women’s engagement in domestic and caring labour, 
lone parenthood, having three more children and disproportionate levels of long-term 
unemployment among parents (of both sexes). The development of national anti-poverty 
strategies, while welcome, must therefore address the income levels of women and 
children (Conroy, 1997) if they are to be successful in eradicating long-term poverty and 
therefore social exclusion. In terms of women, this must mean social policies which 
   
encourage and facilitate earned income (i.e. employment) combined with changes to 
social security systems to more fully recognise the nature of the social insecurities faced 
by women. 
 
However, we should not be neutral in terms of how such recognition should develop; as 
Van Parijs says, to be a full citizen, a full participant in the community, it does not matter 
only that one should access adequate means of subsistence, it is also crucial that this 
access should be secured in a way which does not stigmatise or humiliate, prevent or 
discourage attempts to escape poverty by taking a job or acquiring further training, or 
make any planning nearly impossible because of permanent uncertainty (Van Parijs, 
1993: 23).  
 
Summary  
Following the presentation of UK data illustrating the extent of the failure of current 
social security systems to ‘make up for’ substantial gender differences in earned income, 
this chapter has outlined both the theoretical and the pragmatic reasons why concepts 
of individualisation and economic independence in social security provision have gained 
ground in discussion of potential reforms.  These include concern about the negative 
effects of couple-based means-tested benefits on labour supply and household formation 
and composition, as well as growing dissatisfaction with the extent to which social 
security systems have failed to address women’s poverty or advance gender equality 
while simultaneously drawing in ever more women as contributors.  
 
   
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
A EUROPEAN OVERVIEW 
 
By way of locating the UK (Chapter Two) in the context of practices internationally and by 
way of prefix to our case studies of aggregation and individualisation in Ireland, The 
Netherlands and Australia (Chapters Five, Six and Seven), we present a brief overview of the 
units of assessment used in the social security systems of Western Europe (EU15, Iceland 
and Norway). For this work we have drawn on three sources: Eardley et al (1996), Millar and 
Warman (1996) and MISSOC, the European social security Observatory. We have not been 
able to fully investigate how units of assessment differ by benefit type and target client group 
for all the countries. We confine the review to the benefit and resource units used in benefits 
to guarantee sufficient resources (see Appendix Two for further details).      
 
None of the countries concerned operate a wholly individualised or disaggregated system of 
social assistance. Indeed, Eardley et al note the ‘relative uniformity’ as regards approaches 
to the units of benefit and resources: 
 
With a number of exceptions where wider family obligations have retained a strong 
legal foundation, the nuclear family is the norm, in spite of some tentative moves 
towards forms of individualisation. (1996: 67)  
 
However, while all countries operate aggregated systems, there are differences between 
them as regards the extent to which they use the family as opposed to the household for the 
purposes of calculating benefit entitlement. Most countries have a strong tradition of family 
responsibility and obligation, but there is variation between them according to whether the 
‘family’ is confined to the nuclear family (i.e. married/cohabiting parents and dependent 
children) or whether it also extends to the extended family.  Table 4.1 lists the various ways 
in which family obligations are recognised in social security benefits, while Appendix Three 
presents Millar and Warman’s classification of ‘families of nations’.    
 
Table 4.1: The recognition of family in social security benefits  
Marriage/cohabitation  
Spouses/partners recognised in social insurance benefits  
   
Spouses/partners' entitlements to benefits on the basis of their partners' contributions  
Continuing maintenance obligations  
Parenthood 
Benefits for parents (child benefit, lone parent benefit, child maintenance guarantee, 
parental leave) 
Family obligations to care (between adults) 
Legal obligations between nuclear or extended family members e.g. long-term care  
 
Source: Millar, J. and Warman, A. (1996)  
 
Most countries use the nuclear family for the purposes of both the benefit unit and the 
resource unit - i.e. they only take into account the resources of the claimant and their spouse; 
the resources of dependent children are exempted (either fully or partially) and if they are 
counted it is only against benefits specifically payable in respect of children. In the UK, the 
expectation of intra-family support is limited, only applying to non-dependants' deductions 
from housing costs and child maintenance. In Austria, Germany, Italy and Portugal the 
household is generally taken as the unit of benefit or resources. In Austria and Germany 
social assistance recipients are expected to seek support from parents or grandparents, or 
where adult children are concerned, from their children and grandchildren. In France, for 
the purposes of Aide Sociale, a locally-administered benefit for older people, payment is 
subject to a prior test of their inheritors' means, and monies can be reclaimed from them or 
by first claim on their estate after death. Scandinavian countries operate on a more 
individual model. These do not place maintenance or resource-sharing obligations on 
spouses unless they are legally married. For example, in Denmark and Norway the resources 
of a man cohabiting with a lone mother are not included in assessment of her resources for 
the purposes of a claim for social assistance.  
   
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
INDIVIDUALISATION AND AGGREGATION ISSUES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 
 
 
Introduction to case study analyses 
This chapter, together with the following two country-specific chapters, examine in some 
detail three countries’ experience of individualisation. Ireland (Chapter Five) and The 
Netherlands (Chapter Six) share with the UK, the subject of Chapter Two, a common 
historical past in terms of social security policy, and have relatively low rates of women’s, 
and especially of poor mothers’, employment. Australia (Chapter Seven) is included to 
provide a non-European perspective and to discuss some interesting  policy developments 
in the field of aggregation and individualisation. All of these countries have undergone 
changes to the structure of their benefits over the last ten to fifteen years in the direction of 
greater individualisation, though the approaches adopted by each vary. Each chapter 
discusses the policy legacy from which national strategies have developed, their approaches 
to aggregation and individualisation and the various issues that these raise. Following this 
detailed exploration of individualisation policy and practice in three countries, we pause to 
reflect on these varied national experiences at the end of Chapter Seven before turning to 
consider the lessons and options for UK reform in Chapter Eight. Readers are referred to the 
appendices for detailed coverage of units of assessment in these countries’ principal social 
assistance benefits (Appendix Four) and of women’s employment (Appendix Five).  
 
International scholarship on comparative welfare states: normative and distributive 
analyses 
Following on from the review of units of assessment in Western European countries’ social 
security systems in Chapter Four, and by way of background introduction to the three 
country-specific chapters, we provide a brief overview of approaches to the comparison of 
the case study countries’ welfare arrangements. International welfare state scholarship has 
been preoccupied with categorising countries into different gender welfare models or 
regimes, either in terms of the normative or distributive arenas. These are considered in 
turn.  
 
   
In the normative arena, evidenced in the extent to which mothers are treated primarily as 
mothers or workers, in all three of the UK, Ireland and The Netherlands, the common thread 
is of a welfare state whose primary concern in the 20th Century is with the preservation of 
(male) employment incentives and private welfare (market and/or family).  Hantrais (1993) 
and Lewis (1992) group the UK, Ireland and The Netherlands together - either in terms of 
their strong adherence to a male-breadwinner model (Lewis) or their lack of support for 
working mothers (Hantrais).  The Dutch, Irish and British systems of social security were all 
characterised as 'strong' male breadwinner regimes (Lewis, 1992) in which a strong dividing 
line between public and private responsibility is established, the family is assumed to 
provide unpaid care, and married women/mothers are not expected to take up paid 
employment (where they do they are expected to participate in employment on similar 
terms as men so that minimal level of provision is made for maternity leave, pay and 
reinstatement) (Lewis, 1992).  Langan and Ostner (1991) had also placed Ireland and the UK 
together in an Anglo-Saxon model.   
 
As table 5.1 below shows, this has resulted in historically much lower female labour force 
participation rates in Ireland and The Netherlands than in the UK or Australia. While 
women's labour force participation rates in the former two countries have increased, rates 
in both still fall well below the European average of 63 per cent (1995) (ILO, 2000).  The 
higher rates of female labour force participation in the UK than in Ireland and The 
Netherlands, despite their common policy legacy, can at least partly be explained by 
historically higher rates of part-time employment in the UK which have benefited 
predominantly the labour supply of women and in particular mothers (the UK still has the 
highest rate of mothers' employment, both full-time and part-time). However, The 
Netherlands currently has the highest proportion of men and women in part-time 
employment, though this has been a relatively recent phenomenon (that is, since the mid 
1980s). A further point of note is that these broad figures belie differences between women 
of different marital and parental status. Economic activity and employment rates of 
married women have been lower in all the countries than those of unmarried and 
divorced/separated women, while mothers' employment rates have been, and still are, 
lower than those of women without children  (for details see Appendix Five).  
   
 
   
Table 5.1 Labour force participation rates - women, aged 15-64 
 
Country 1980 1995 
United Kingdom 57.0 65.6 
Australia 52.0 64.8 
Netherlands 38.2 55.0 
Ireland 34.7 40.9 
 Source: ILO, 2000: table 4 
 
Despite the apparent similarities among the three countries in the normative arena, analyses 
of the distributive arena have placed Ireland, The Netherlands, Australia and the UK in very 
different categories.  For example, Bradshaw et al's (1993: 265) categorisation of the relative 
generosity of the distributive packages available to model families of different sizes and 
compositions (encompassing social security payments, tax allowances, housing costs, health 
care and educational services) placed France, Luxembourg and Belgium together as 
providing the most generous child support packages, followed by the group of Denmark, UK, 
Germany, Australia and The Netherlands, while families in the last group - Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, Republic of Ireland, Greece and the USA - received the least generous packages.  In 
subsequent analysis of the same material, Shaver and Bradshaw (1993) examined the extent 
of support for '[economically] dependent wives'. They found that support for ‘wifely labour’ 
under the traditional male breadwinner model was strongest in Ireland, Denmark, Germany 
and the Benelux countries, medium in a group comprising France, Portugal and Spain, and 
weak in a third group containing the UK and Australia.  Meanwhile, Siaroff (1994), using 
three factors (the basis of family welfare orientation, which parent is the recipient of benefits 
and female work desirability), placed Ireland in a 'late female mobilisation welfare state' 
cluster which also included the 'Latin Rim' countries; the UK was characterised as a 
'Protestant liberal welfare state', along with the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, 
while The Netherlands was placed in the advanced Christian democratic welfare states, 
along with Germany, France, Austria and Belgium.  Finally, Duncan (1995) argued for the 
placement of Ireland in a group labeled 'transitional from private patriarchy' alongside the 
countries of southern Europe, while England and Scotland were defined as in transition from 
'the housewife contract' characteristic of the Bismarckian countries of Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland, towards the 'dual role contract' of France and Finland. Wales and Northern 
   
Ireland were defined as remaining within 'the housewife contract'. The Netherlands 
displayed two gender contracts, the housewife contract and the equality contract, as did 
Norway. 
 
The Irish policy legacy 
One of the problems in classifying Ireland along with the UK or with The Netherlands, is 
that the management of mothers, and hence women's social and reproductive rights, has 
been more explicitly the focus of family law and social policy in Ireland than in the other 
countries. In recognition of this, the relationship between Catholic corporatism and 'male 
breadwinner' typologies has subsequently been the focus of analyses by Conroy Jackson 
(1993), Yeates (1997), and McLaughlin and Rodgers (1997) and McLaughlin and Yeates 
(1999). These have highlighted that while Britain, and to a lesser extent Northern Ireland, 
moved towards universalism and a greater role for the state in welfare provision, in Ireland 
selectivist and familist principles were consolidated during the post-partition period 
(Yeates, 1997). Moreover, the influence of Catholic teaching in social policy meant the 
application of subsidiarity to welfare circumscribed the role of the state and ensured that 
the voluntary sector and the Church continued to play a central role in direct welfare 
provision in health, education and social care.  Keeping the state at arm's length also meant 
an enhanced role for voluntary sector professionals and the Catholic Church in social 
planning and provision.  Selectivist, minimalist level of welfare services for distributive 
policies affecting women's social rights meant that social care services for children, 
disabled and elderly people rely on the family to provide the bulk of care for its members 
(Yeates, 1997; McLaughlin and Yeates, 1999).  The combination of these factors meant that 
although the state played a residual role in the provision of welfare services, and that the 
Church, voluntary sector and the family all played a lead one, it was also highly 
interventionist in regulating women's fertility and reproduction, and, consequently, their 
labour supply (Pyle, 1990).   
 
Ireland's Beveridgean social security system, which was in part a hangover from the pre-
partition British system became more familialised following partition, and the normative 
prescriptions of women's role as homemakers and childbearers became an explicit point of 
reference in the 1937 Constitution.  This defined the Family as 'the natural and fundamental 
unit group of Society' (41, 1.1), 'the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to 
   
the welfare of the Nation and the State' (41, 1.2). The type of family to which the 
Constitution referred was the heterosexual marital family ('the State pledges itself to guard 
with special care the institution of marriage on which the Family is founded', 41, 3.1).  
Women were defined as dependants of their husbands (41, 2.1) and as 
mothers/homemakers (41, 2.2).  These principles in Ireland, as in Britain, guided social 
welfare, taxation and employment policies, institutionalising the 'family wage', women's 
economic dependency within marriage and their primary role as full-time mothers.   
 
Moreover, Britain and Ireland shared a number of common measures, such as the married 
women's 'small stamp' (reduced national insurance contributions for married women in 
employment), the marriage bar and additional tax and social welfare allowances for 
married men with dependent wives, though the measures to remove married women from 
employment in Ireland were much greater than in the British system.  Thus, Ireland also 
enacted the marriage grant which closed women's insurance contributions record upon 
marriage in return for a one-off payment. In addition, women’s rates of contribution and 
benefit were lower than those of men in comparable circumstances, and more stringent 
conditions were attached to women claimants than to men – for example, women were 
required to have a longer contribution record in order to claim benefits but were paid 
benefit for a shorter duration than men (Yeates, 1997).   
 
Although the most obvious manifestation of unequal treatment of some (i.e. single) women 
had been eliminated in the 1950s and 1960s, it was not until the 1970s that a major turning 
point occurred in the development of welfare rights of women in general, and of mothers 
in particular.  Between 1968 and 1974 five women-only schemes - Deserted Wives’ Benefit 
and Allowance, Unmarried Mothers' Allowance, Prisoners' Wives Allowance, Single 
Woman's Allowance - were introduced for women who could not rely on men in their 
capacity as husbands or fathers to provide for their financial security.  With the exception 
of Deserted Wives’ Benefit these were social assistance schemes (Yeates, 1997). The 
integration of women into social assistance, combined with the failure to radically reform 
the contributory system, meant that Ireland has relied on this category of non-contributory 
benefits to ensure women's economic independence.  The level of financial support for 
married, non-employed wives via the social security and taxation systems is one of the 
highest in the advanced industrialised countries, but the level of support for children, and 
   
hence support for 'motherly labour' is one of the lowest (Shaver and Bradshaw, 1993). The 
way in which the Irish regime 'rewards' homemakers has important implications for 
women's economic independence.   
 
First, the additional income levered into 'traditional' households in respect of a full-time, 
dependent wife is directed to the 'head of the household' who is left to distribute it 
responsibly.  Although the state formally 'supports' full-time homemakers, this does not 
translate into an independent income for them, and universal Child Benefit was found to be 
'the largest source of independent income available to women in two out of every three 
families with dependent children' (Rottman, 1994). This study highlighted that 58 per cent 
of mothers had no other source of income and for a further 10 per cent of mothers their 
weekly income from employment or interest amounted to less than Child Benefit. This 
varied by class and income of the household, and 80 per cent of women in unskilled 
households and in the bottom income quintile had no independent income whatsoever.   
 
Second, the women-only schemes ensured a level of state support only when men could not 
be relied upon or were absent (this principle had been established in 1935 for widows).  
The deserted wives' payments were aimed at married (but deserted) mothers, while the 
Unmarried Mother's Allowance represented the acceptance by the State of the right of 
unmarried mothers and their extra-marital children to public support (Conroy, 1993). The 
latter is of particular significance because, although the State incurred the risk that the 
provision of the benefit would be seen to undermine the marital family, it was consistent 
with the constitutional prescriptions for motherhood.  The Unmarried Mother's Allowance 
offered an incentive for mothers to stay at home rather than take up paid employment (paid 
employment was prohibited for recipients) and it protected the 'special' role of the 
motherhood in Irish society (Conroy, 1993). Although the contingencies which mothers 
faced were extended to cover a broader range of circumstances under which men could 
not, or would not, support their families, the payments were still designed to dissuade 
mothers from taking up or staying in paid employment.  In other words, the state could 
accept the principle of support for non-marital families so long as women living in them 
were as discouraged from seeking paid employment as women in marital families.  The 
policy legacy of the Irish regime was such that it strongly militated against married 
women's and mothers' employment, a legacy that is still very much evident today in lower 
   
employment rates of women in Ireland compared with many, if not most other, European 
countries. 
 
The Irish individualisation reform agenda 
The beginnings of the process of individualisation can be traced back to the 1970s with the 
introduction of individual entitlements for women without male partners under the women-
only schemes, as noted above. Of particular note in this regard were the national effects of 
EC Equality Directives. Unlike the UK, where cohabiting couples have been treated the same 
as married couples for the purpose of social security since the introduction of cohabitation 
rules under Supplementary Benefit in the early 1970s, in Ireland this was only introduced in 
1989 for the purpose of unemployment payments as a consequence of the 1979 Equal 
Treatment Directive.  The effects of this Directive entailed, inter alia, permitting married 
women to claim Unemployment Assistance, but in order 'to prevent a situation in which each 
spouse could claim for the other, the implementation of the directive required a detailed 
specification of dependency' (Cook and McCashin, 1992: 35).  The Social Welfare (n° 2) Act 
(1985) thus stipulated that where both of a married couple living together qualified for 
unemployment assistance in their own right, the overall amount payable to the couple would 
be limited to what they would receive if only one spouse claimed and received an allowance 
for the other as an adult dependant.  In effect, sex equality for married women merely 
reiterated the principle of dependency. 
 
This 'solution' to the problem of sex equality in social security had repercussions beyond 
the immediate issue at hand: social security policy was framed less in terms of gender 
(in)equality in access to benefit and more in terms of the extent to which it treated different 
family types (married/cohabiting, with or without children, couple/lone parent families) 
(in)equitably.  In the mid 1980s this was expressed in terms of the unequal treatment of 
married couples relative to cohabiting (heterosexual) couples.  Thus, up to 1989, cohabiting 
men and women were not recognised as a couple and each individual was entitled to the 
full personal level of Unemployment Assistance. This meant, however, that cohabiting 
couples were treated more favourably (i.e. received more money) than comparable 
married couples because the latter were subject to the limitation rules described above. 
The less favourable treatment of the marital family compared with the non-marital family 
was successfully challenged as unconstitutional (the Hyland case).  In an attempt to resolve 
   
this issue, the Social Welfare (n° 2) Act (1989) legislated for the extension of the limitation 
of entitlements to cohabiting couples so as to treat them the same as married couples.  Thus, 
rather than abolish the limitation rule for married couples it was extended, and provision 
for cohabitees was levelled down to that enjoyed by married couples (Cook and McCashin, 
1992). This limitation rule has since been extended to cover other low-income heterosexual 
households, e.g. disabled persons when Disability Allowance replaced Disabled Person's 
Maintenance Allowance in 1996 (Yeates, 1997).   
 
Successive moves to reduce formal gender inequality in access to, and rates of, benefit have 
not fundamentally challenged the principle of women's economic dependency.  Although it 
is possible to discern a gradual move towards individualisation, this has mainly entailed (i) 
the introduction of benefits for women who are unable to rely on a male breadwinner to 
support them (lone parents, deserted wives, widows) and (ii) the introduction of payment 
splitting for couples who specifically request it (this has been remarkably unsuccessful, with 
just one per cent of couples using this facility).  At the same time, the government has 
retained, even extended, the use of the household unit of assessment (eligibility, assessment 
and payment) and derived rights (Yeates, 2000). In legislation allowing women to retain 
their benefit entitlements 'earned' through marriage after divorce, the Irish government 
extended what were effectively derived rights by granting equal status between married, 
separated, widowed and divorced women. This meant, for example, that divorced women 
would have the same rights as their ex-husband's second (or third, fourth…) wife for the 
purpose of claiming Widow's (Contributory) Pension.  As there are no restrictions on the 
number of time marriage and divorce can take place, Yeates (1997) has pointed out that the 
Irish social welfare system is faced with the prospect of multiple people claiming benefits off 
a single contributions record.  There are also other ways in which dependency is structured 
into the Irish social security system – in ‘dual entitlement’ benefits rights are acquired by the 
spouse or other dependants of the insured person (Widow/er's (Contributory) Pension, Old 
Age (contributory) Pension, Treatment Benefit and Death Grant all allow current and former 
spouses to claim off each others' insurance record) and in additions paid to the 
recipient/insured person in recognition of his or her dependants (Qualified Adult 
Allowances are payable on all benefits). 
  
   
These derived rights can be seen in the broader context of how the social security system 
takes account of heterosexual adult relationships and living arrangements. Such 
relationships are also recognised in eligibility criteria.  For example, the cohabitation rule 
applies to the One Parent Family Benefit, Deserted Wives' Allowance and Benefit, 
Widow/er's (Contributory) Pension and Widow/er's (Non-Contributory) Pension. It debars 
recipients from claiming these payments if married to, or cohabiting with, a partner of the 
opposite sex. Heterosexual relationships are also recognised in joint assessment of eligibility 
and income. For the purposes of Family Income Supplement, couples can aggregate their 
hours worked to reach the 19 hours worked per week or 38 hours worked every fortnight 
required for entitlement; under 'aggregation' rules both partners' status is taken into 
account for the purpose of calculating the amount of payment for means-tested benefits.   
 
It is important to note that there are also elements of individualisation within the Irish 
system, such as 'payment-splitting' and 'entitlement-splitting' and the current working 
groups and commissions established to take forward the individualisation agenda take these 
provisions as their starting points (see below). Splitting of social security payments is only 
done in exceptional circumstances and its use is minimal (about 1 per cent of payments). 
Similarly, employment supports such as the Back-to-Work Allowance, as well as 
employment and training schemes such as the Whole-Time Jobs Initiative, Community 
Employment and VTOS schemes all allow dependent spouses to take their 
husband/partner's place if he does not wish to avail of it.  As with the 'dual entitlement' 
benefits, no statistics are available as to what proportion of the 35 per cent of women on the 
Back to Work scheme who were married had entered via the adult dependant transfer route 
(Yeates, 2000). 
 
As a result of the failure to more radically overhaul the social security system, gender 
inequalities in the receipt of social insurance and assistance benefits remain pronounced 
(see table 5.2).  These patterns of receipt are in part the effect of gendered economic activity 
(women constitute the majority of carers and homemakers) and of family composition (the 
majority of lone parents are women).   
   
Table 5.2  Receipt of selected social welfare payments: women as a proportion of all 
recipients (%) 1999, Republic of Ireland 
 
 Women  
Social Insurance 
Social Assistance 
55  
51  
Social Insurance  
Old Age (Contributory) Pension 36 
Retirement Pension 26  
Widow/er’s Pension 99  
Disability Benefit 62  
Invalidity Pension 42  
Disablement Benefit 16  
Unemployment Benefit 55  
Social Assistance  
Old Age (non-contributory) Pension 57  
Pre-Retirement Allowance 18  
Widow’s (non-contributory) Pension 99  
One Parent Family Payment 97  
Disability Allowance 40  
Carer’s Allowance 79  
Unemployment Assistance 28  
Supplementary Welfare Allowance 38  
Employment Supports (average) (2) 
Family Income Supplement 
Back to Work Allowance 
Back to Education Allowance 
Back to Work (Enterprise) Allowance 
Farm Assistance / Smallholders 
24  
46  
15  
46  
16  
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Qualified Adults 
Unemployment Benefit 
Unemployment Assistance 
Old Age (Contributory) Pension 
Old Age (Non-Contributory) Pension 
Retirement Pension 
 
94% 
91% 
98% 
90% 
98% 
Source: Tables A13, A14. 1999 Statistical Information Report, DSCFA. Information on 
qualified adults kindly supplied by DSFCA’s Statistical Branch.  
 
 
   
Although the number of QAAs (Qualified Adult Allowances, i.e. adult increases) paid have 
declined by 25 per cent since 1992 (Carroll, 2000), there are still 130,000 people in respect 
of whom QAAs are paid, and women comprise between 90 per cent and 98 per cent of these, 
depending on the payment concerned. Pensions illustrate how women have been 
incorporated as dependants into the social security system. Women continue to comprise 
the majority (57 per cent) of recipients of Old Age (Non-Contributory) Pension and a 
minority of recipients of Old Age (Contributory) Pension (36 per cent) and Retirement 
Pension (26 per cent) (1999).  Of note here is the skewing effect on statistics of Widow/er's 
(Contributory) Benefit which, like Treatment Benefit and the Death Grant, allows women 
(and men) to claim either off their own or their spouse's insurance record. Unfortunately, 
statistics are not collected regarding the gender differences in claims from these dual 
entitlement benefits - benefits that grant rights either as workers or as wives (or husbands).  
Thus, we do not know what proportion of these 90,000 women who, were it not for the fact 
that they could claim off their husband's insurance record, would otherwise have to claim 
the social assistance equivalent.  Neither do we know the difference in the amount paid to 
men and women recipients of these dual entitlement benefits where the pension is paid on 
the basis of their own as compared with their spouse's record (Yeates, 2000).  It is possible, 
however, to surmise that women claiming off their husband's insurance record amount to a 
considerable number. In Northern Ireland, where similar assumptions about dependency 
also prevail, and where statistics are available, in 1985 just 27 per cent of recipients of 
Retirement Pension were women receiving it on the basis of their own insurance record (a 
further 17 per cent were married women receiving it on the basis of their husband’s 
insurance and 22 per cent were widows), though this had increased to 32 per cent by 1995 
(McLaughlin and Yeates, 1999).     
 
In the remainder of this section we examine Ireland's current policy task forces on the 
individualisation of social security.  It is important to note that social security 
individualisation is occurring alongside controversial moves towards the individualisation 
of tax.  It is not in the remit of this report to consider tax individualisation, although the tax 
system clearly has important implications for women's labour market participation choices 
(see NESF (2000) for a critical review of individualisation in the tax system). 
 
   
Social policy development in Ireland has taken place in the context of the influence of EU 
social law (since mid 1970s) and of national partnership programmes (since 1985).  The 
effects of the former were noted above; as regards the latter, the social element of 
partnership became more central in the mid-1990s, while the pressure for individualisation 
was kept up by women's groups and the European Commission.  Various government 
reviews of social policy have directly and indirectly prompted consideration of how the Irish 
social security system could be individualised. Of particular note here were the reviews of 
the tax and social welfare system (1995), social insurance (1996), the treatment of different 
household types (1999), the Commission on the Family (1997) and the national anti-poverty 
strategy (NAPS) (1997). Various other policy-making bodies have contributed to the debate, 
such as the NESC (1999) and the NESF (2000).  All of these initiatives have taken place in a 
context of a commitment to develop a stronger social rights framework in Ireland (North and 
South), including the right to an adequate standard of living.  The Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission (2001) is actively considering the introduction of such a right as part of 
a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, encompassing subsistence items (food, clothing), general 
provision for living standards (social security) and social and civic care.  In the Republic, the 
Irish Commission for Justice and Peace (1998) has advocated the inclusion of a right to an 
adequate standard of living as part of a package of social rights (health, housing, nutrition) 
in a revised Irish Constitution (Combat Poverty Agency, 2001).   
 
Of particular note for the purpose of the present discussion was the setting up of a Working 
Party in May 1997 to examine the treatment of married, cohabiting and one-parent 
households under the tax and social welfare codes. The Report, to which McLaughlin 
contributed as annex, examined the feasibility of four models of individualisation:  
 
(i)  Total independent treatment in the social security system (individual means tests and 
the payment of unconditional benefits to non-working partners);  
 
(ii)  Retention of assessment for means-tested payments on a couple basis, with either full 
rates to be paid on an individual basis once entitlement is established or adult 
increases to be paid directly to the ‘adult dependant’;   
 
   
(iii)  Payment of a Household Responsibility Payment (HRP), whereby social security 
benefits would henceforth comprise a personal payment for each adult in a household 
and one HRP for each household, the combined total of which would be equivalent to 
the married rate (1.6/1.7 of two personal rates).    
 
(iv)  Modernisation of social insurance, entailing the replacement of derived rights by 
participation rights, facilitated by the introduction of credits for those undertaking 
informal care or in third-level education, and/or a part-time Unemployment Benefit. 
Qualified Adult Additions would be abolished since individual entitlements can be 
established through a combination of employment, disregards and contribution 
credits.    
 
The Working Group favoured the fourth option, modernising social insurance, but the 
Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs (DSCFA) embarked on administrative 
individualisation somewhat akin to option (ii). The main elements of this administrative 
individualisation as set out in Budget 2000 were:   
 
(i)  The raising of Qualified Adult Allowances from 60 per cent to 70 per cent of the value 
of the main payment, to be implemented over three budgets and commencing with 
Budget 2000.  For older people, adult dependant payments will be equalised to the 
rate of Old Age (non-contributory) Pension; QAAs will be added to the main payment 
and divided by two.    
 
(ii)  Since April 2000 the full rate of the child dependant allowance (CDA) can be retained 
until the qualified adult's earnings are more than IR£135 per week (gross) 
(previously, half of the CDA was lost when the QA's earnings reached IR£60 gross).  
This is to facilitate qualified adults with children (especially in larger families) in 
moving into part-time work. 
 
(iii)  Since April 2000 qualified adults can earn IR£70 gross (previously IR£60 gross) 
before the QAA begins to be withdrawn; the withdrawal is tapered up to £135 per 
week gross (up from £105 gross).   
 
   
However, critics have pointed out that although the income thresholds have been raised, the 
interaction between (i) the operation of income disregards (IR£70 if Qualified Adult works 
4 days or more; IR£30 if s/he works three days or less) which are deducted from the 
Qualified Adult's net income and (ii) the withdrawal rate of 50p in the pound of remaining 
earnings from claimants' Unemployment Assistance, still constitutes a significant monetary 
disincentive to take up paid work and may still cause conflict about the intra-familial 
distribution of money (NESF, 2000).   
 
The second major element of the Irish individualisation strategy is the reform of child income 
support arrangements.  Child income support, as noted earlier, is one of the few sources of 
women's (mothers') independent income, yet 'motherly' labour has been one of the least 
rewarded forms of labour.  As regards the existing structure of child income support, it is 
split between the social security system (Child Dependant Allowances, Family Income 
Supplement and Child Benefit) and the tax system (double tax allowances or bands, and the 
Home Carer's Allowance). Budget 2001 announced a 59 per cent increase in the value of 
Child Benefit for the first and second children, and a 54 per cent increase for the third and 
subsequent children, and it prioritised Child Benefit as the main mechanism for meeting the 
additional costs of children.  As the Combat Poverty Agency has argued, 'child benefit has 
been mainstreamed as the main fiscal instrument for child income and represents the 
individualisation of tax and welfare policy as it applies to children' (CPA Budget 2001: 6). In 
essence, there has been a shift away from (selective) CDAs towards (universal) CB.  The 
advantages of Child Benefit as a universal, flat-rate payment are that it avoids the 
unemployment and poverty traps associated with means-tested benefits; it has a high take-
up rate; it is paid to mothers as the primary carer, and it promotes horizontal equity between 
households at similar income levels (CPA; Commission on the Family, 1997; Childcare 2000 
Expert Working Group). The enhancement of its value will increase the incomes of women, 
in or out of work.  However, critics have pointed to the still-substantial shortfalls in family 
income, estimated to be IR£6.40 per week, and even greater than this if there are older 
children present.  In addition, Child Dependant Allowances remain unchanged. Overall, the 
combined value of the changes in the social welfare part of the reforms amount to a 24 per 
cent increase rather than the advertised 59 per cent or 54 per cent (CPA, 2001). The Combat 
Poverty Agency acknowledges that the government is committed to substantially increasing 
the value of child benefit by 2003, by 176 per cent for first and second children, and by 161 
   
per cent for the third and subsequent children (compared with 2000 rates), but it criticises 
the strategy for not introducing age-related payments.     
 
Overall, it is clear that contemporary social security individualisation agenda in Ireland is 
driven as much by labour market concerns as by poverty concerns (Yeates, 2000). Indeed, 
the main policy priorities have been with removing obstacles to returning to work, with 
putting in place incentives to return to work and ensuring that obligations to seek and take 
up paid work are adequately enforced (NESF, 2000). The groups addressed have been the 
unemployed and other groups that are economically inactive but capable of work (lone 
parents, disabled). The NESF has called for the development of 'a more comprehensive 
welfare to work strategy to ensure that as far as possible the social welfare system facilitates 
access to paid employment opportunities for all, regardless of social welfare category' (2000: 
67).  It also wants welfare to work outcomes to be taken into account in any individualisation 
strategy since administrative individualisation will not solve the problems created by 
aggregation (i.e. one partner's earnings affecting the means of the other partner) (2000: 69).   
 
The issues addressed by the Working Group on the equitable treatment of households under 
the tax and social welfare code (1999) were taken up by the Programme for Prosperity and 
Fairness (PPF) (framework III, 3.2), whose income adequacy objectives are:  
 
§ To provide every person with sufficient income to live life with dignity. 
§ To ensure that the real value of Social Welfare payments is maintained and where 
possible enhanced to ensure that all share in the fruits of economic growth. 
§ To develop proposals to progress the individualisation of Social Welfare payments in 
the context of continuation of joint assessment of means. 
§ To remove poverty traps, particularly for low paid workers, and improve the real 
income position of employees.   
(PPF: 80, emphasis added). 
 
The PPF set up two Working Groups, one on administrative individualisation and the other 
on individualisation through social insurance.  A third Working Group on Adequacy 
Benchmarking and Indexation was also set up but excluded from its remit are issues to do 
with aggregation and the unequal distribution of resources as a cause of (women's) 
   
inadequate incomes; it is not examining individualisation and is proceeding on the 
assumption of adult dependant's allowances being increased to 70 per cent of the main 
payment. The remit of the administrative individualisation Working Group is 'to produce 
proposals to progress the implementation of administrative individualisation within the 
Social Welfare system' (PPF: 81). Since it will examine how to further individualise means-
tested benefits in the context of joint assessment of means, it will not be looking at the 
validity of joint assessment of means or at assumptions of income sharing between partners. 
The Working Party is to consider how separate payments could be 'mainstreamed' into all 
benefits.  The remit of the Working Group on individualisation through social insurance is 
'to produce proposals for the development of a fully inclusive social insurance model which 
would facilitate combining work and family responsibilities in the context of changing 
working and social patterns’ (PPF: 81).  The DSCFA, at least, appears to favour this as a long-
term strategy for the individualisation of social security, because, as it acknowledges, the 
social insurance model is already an individualised one: 'the way forward for 
individualisation in our social welfare system will be in the context of social insurance' 
(Carroll, 2000). However, like the Commission on Social Justice (Chapter Two), it also 
acknowledges the need to reform social insurance for a better balance between paid work 
and family/caring responsibilities and to adapt contribution requirements to ensure that 
certain groups are not excluded from gaining a foothold in the system. On the latter point, it 
has considered the possibility of extending credits or moving towards residency as the basis 
of entitlement.   
 
Progress in policy discussions in these fora has proved disappointing. The sequencing of  
these working parties has meant that the social insurance Working Group will only be 
established once the Working Group on administrative individualisation has completed its 
work.  However, at the time of writing, the latter has not met since December 2000, while 
the DSCFA and trades unions apparently take the view that individualisation should first 
begin with pensions (i.e. that existing commitments should first be implemented) and only 
after that should other areas be examined. One should also not discount the influence of 
arguments against individualisation and in favour of aggregation advanced within and 
outside of government, which include views that a husband's contributions and his payment 
are his own property, not to be shared with his wife, and that splitting social security 
payments between the claimant and 'his' dependant would in effect pay married women to 
   
stay at home to do 'nothing' and that this would be unfair to other women, such as lone 
parents, who are increasingly expected to take up paid work.  These delays mean that the 
commitment to further administrative individualisation in Budget 2001 is no longer on 
track, although the individualisation of taxation will continue to be implemented.   The 
individualisation issue is being 'kept alive' in the NESF, the NESC and the CPA.   
  
   
CHAPTER SIX 
 
INDIVIDUALISATION AND AGGREGATION ISSUES IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
 
The Dutch policy legacy 
Renowned for the generosity of its social security arrangements, The Netherlands was 
classified as a highly wage labour ‘decommodifying’ regime, along with the Scandinavian 
countries, Belgium and Austria (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Social security effectively 
'insulated' workers from dependence on selling their wage labour to sustain their living 
standards. Thus, already in 1947 unemployment benefits in The Netherlands were fixed at 
80 per cent of previous earnings for breadwinners with children, 60-70 per cent for other 
categories; in 1964 it became 80 per cent for all unemployed people (Becker, 2000: 223). 
The Disability Security Act (1967) provided 100 per cent earnings substitutes for workers 
deemed 100 per cent disabled (Cox, 1993: 152). Thus, although not properly a social 
democratic regime (Becker, 2000), the Dutch regime's 'generosity' was typical of social 
democratic regimes (Goodin et al, 1999). This 'generous' Dutch regime, as judged by its high 
earnings-replacement ratios for workers, contrasted with Ireland and the UK which featured 
amongst the low wage labour decommodifying regimes where benefits were paid on a flat-
rate, subsistence level.  
 
The coalition of Catholics and Socialists in the late 1940s which founded the post-war Dutch 
welfare state meant that high decommodification of (male) wage labour was not only a 
reflection of the desire to avoid poverty, or a reflection of solidarity and social justice, but it 
was also - and some argue more importantly (Bussemaker and van Kersbergen, 1994) - an 
expression of the view that there should be no second income since married women would 
work full-time in the home (Becker, 1999: 223). As Bussemaker et al (1997) argue, the Dutch 
welfare state has for most of its post-war history been an 'extreme' breadwinner-
homemaker model, founded on the assumption of nuclear family and a strongly gendered 
division of labour within it. There were three main aspects to this. First, married women 
were discouraged from entering and remaining in the labour market and it was only in the 
late 1960s that they gained employment rights preventing them from being made redundant 
when they married, became pregnant or gave birth. Married women who were employed did 
   
not have pension rights, and the taxation system imposed severe work disincentives for 
second earners. Second, the identification of men with breadwinning and maintenance 
implied that the male earned a 'family' wage and that he was given the male financial support 
to keep 'his' family. Thus, he was paid child allowances and his dependants were included in 
his insurance record without having to pay any additional contributions. Third, benefit 
entitlements were strongly linked to employment status: benefits were either linked to the 
previous wage or to the minimum wage (1997: 1997-8). The institutionalisation of married 
women’s dependency on their husbands was also evident in the expectation that mothers 
should not have to be available for work until the child(ren) attains the age of 18, and that 
they should be paid benefits at a level linked to the minimum wage (Bussemaker et al, 1997: 
98). This was, of course, also the case in the UK and Ireland; however, unlike Ireland, the 
principle of full-time motherhood was never enshrined in social law and instead it was (like 
the UK) embedded in social practice (Bussemaker and van Kersbergen, 1999).  
 
This combination of a relatively high level of benefits with the breadwinner/homemaker 
structure meant that 'the Dutch welfare state is characterised by a considerable degree of 
de-commodification of male wage-earners and a high level of stratification between men and 
women' (Bussemaker and van Kersbergen, 1994: 22, emphasis in original). These policies 
have depressed women's access to independent income. Most women and almost all 
mothers (couple and lone mothers), in The Netherlands, like Ireland, were full-time mothers 
until the beginning of the 1980s. Their relatively recent increase in employment has been 
channelled to part-time employment (see Appendix Five). This has had repercussions for 
women's economic independence as their wage was barely sufficient to live on and can be 
considered more as a supplement to that of their male partner.  
 
Like Ireland, the history of The Netherlands' 'generous' but familist policy is a consequence 
or expression of the influence of Catholic-corporatist notions of social harmony, in addition 
to the Calvinist belief in human humility and faith in benign, paternalist government (Cox, 
1993). The influence of religion on the development of welfare provisions is the subject of 
considerable discussion in the academic literature, and The Netherlands is a striking 
example of this. Pillarisation refers to 'the denominational segregation in social 
organisations', such as schools, charitable organisations and social work. Dutch society was 
'pillarised' into Catholic, Protestant and secular (which was sub-divided into proletarian 
   
socialist and middle-class liberal) segments with organisational networks and welfare 
provisions of their own (Bussemaker et al, 1997; Kersbergen, 1995). Subsidiarity in this 
context meant that state was subsidiary both to these confessional pillars as well as to the 
family.  The application of subsidiarity where the family, as the 'lowest' social unit has 
primary responsibility to provide for the care and welfare of its members, ensured that the 
local state only allocated funds when no other resources were forthcoming from either the 
family or voluntary sector. Like Ireland, Dutch social policy can also be regarded as a site 
over which the church and state have battled as regards the nature and extent of 
'interference' of state institutions in family life:  
 
the corporatist regimes are also typically shaped by the Church, and hence strongly 
committed to the preservation of traditional familyhood. Social insurance typically 
excludes non-working wives, and family benefits encourage motherhood. Daycare 
and similar family services are conspicuously underdeveloped; the principle of 
'subsidiarity' serves to emphasise that the state will only interfere when the family's 
capacity to service its members is exhausted. (Esping Andersen, 1990: 27)  
  
The dominance of Christian-conservative organisations and political parties from the late 
1940s to the mid 1960s meant that Dutch society was very conservative (Becker, 2000; 
Cox, 1993). However, the social, cultural and political changes, including rapid 
secularisation, that occurred in the 1960s in The Netherlands, as elsewhere, withered the 
basis of pillarisation and brought about the social democratisation of the welfare state. In 
the 1970s, a marked change in social ideology occurred, seen 'in the shift from the 
traditional Dutch family to the rise of individual welfare claims as the point of reference for 
social policy' (Becker, 2000: 224). Strengthening social democratic and emancipatory 
movements placed strong welfare expectations on the state, and up to the early 1980s the 
Dutch welfare state could be described as having undergone 'a change from predominantly 
elitist paternalism towards a social democratised or progressive paternalism' (ibid). The 
1980s political landscape witnessed a shift towards the right and austerity policies froze 
the expansion of welfare hithertofore: the minimum wage was frozen, reducing the value 
of minimum benefits, eligibility rules were tightened, and social security contributions 
were raised. In the late 1980s and early 1990s gross replacement rates were reduced from 
80 to 70 per cent (1987) and the disability scheme was restructured (1992). Austerity 
   
arguments were, Becker argues, more important than other socio-ideological changes that 
also occurred around this time - the rise of liberal values of individual initiative and 
responsibility and of the conservative principle of subsidiarity.  Yet these clearly shaped 
the restructuring of welfare provisions at the time and the Dutch welfare system, as Becker 
summarises, 'has been liberalised to a certain degree [although] some paternalist 
assumptions are still important and for the rest, the system is characterised by the 
institutional inertia of paternalist and Social Democratic assumptions that were effective in 
the past' (Becker, 2000: 226; van der Veen and Trommel, 1999; Cox, 1999).  
 
The Dutch individualisation reform agenda  
Since the 1980s, but particularly during the 1990s,  the Dutch welfare state underwent a 
radical overhaul of its 'strong' breadwinner policies, and has been characterised as having 
undergone a shift from an extreme breadwinner/homemaker model to a one-and-a-half 
worker model (Plantenga, 1999) - with women constituting the 'half' worker.   
 
Individualisation has been introduced in several areas and in respect of both entitlements 
and obligations.  Like Ireland and the UK, this was prompted by EU sex equality legislation. 
As Sainsbury (1996) notes, 1980s reforms ended direct discrimination against married 
women in disability benefits (1980), national retirement pensions (1985) and extended 
unemployment benefits (1987). Another set of reforms addressed the unit of assessment 
used for certain schemes, changing it from a household to an individual basis, such as 
national insurance contributions (previously dependants were included in the 
breadwinner's insurance scheme at no extra cost). Some commentators regard the effect of 
EU equality legislation as has having promoted 'significant equality of access to benefit for 
women' by removing the exclusions against married women in several major benefits 
(Sohrab, 2000). The Netherlands has, like Ireland, introduced payment splitting (in 1987 in 
The Netherlands).  However, this apparent strengthening of women's rights must be set in 
the context of the austerity measures noted above whose effects entailed a growing reliance 
on means-testing in minimum benefits, the restriction of entitlements to benefits, and the 
levelling-down of benefits (e.g. sickness and disability benefits were reduced from 80 to 70 
per cent of previous earnings). Indeed, access to unemployment benefit still favours those 
(mainly men) with long contribution records (Sohrab, 2000: 113; Van Der Veen and 
Trommel, 1999).  
   
Regarding the consequences of these policies for women's access to social security benefits, 
table 6.1 below shows that while women have increased as a proportion of all those receiving 
long-term disability and unemployment benefits they still remain a minority (about one-
third) of such recipients. When all long-term benefits are taken into account women 
constituted a lower proportion of long-term beneficiaries in 1990 than in 1970. 
Furthermore, women constitute an even greater proportion of those receiving long-term 
assistance (ABW) in 1990 than they did in 1970 (Sainsbury, 1996).    
 
 
Table 6.1  Long-term utilisation of social benefits in The Netherlands, 1970-90  
 
      1970  1980  1990 
Disability benefits         
 % long-term beneficiaries of all persons          
 receiving disability benefits                            53                     58                   75 
 Women as a % of all receiving                        
 long-term benefits                                           27                     27                   31 
 
 Unemployment benefits     
% long-term beneficiaries of all persons                     
 receiving unemployment benefits                     3                       9                  27 
 Women as a % of all receiving                        
 long-term benefits                                           26                     25                  34 
  
Assistance ABW     
 % of long-term beneficiaries 
 of all assistance recipients                              41                       44                55 
 Women as a % of all receiving                        
 long-term benefits                                           80                       89               93 
% women of all long-term beneficiaries   39      34               38 
 
Source: Sainsbury (1996) table 8.4 
 
Individualisation in The Netherlands, as in Ireland, has been strongly driven by labour 
market concerns, particularly by high rates of unemployment in the late 1980s and by 
relatively high levels of non-employment. Cultural-political trends have shifted the emphasis 
   
onto wage labour as the means by which economic independence and social integration 
should be attained. Individualisation has also taken place within the context of a broader 
move to recast the role of social assistance from that of safety net to that of 'trampoline' into 
paid work. Accordingly, individualisation as it applies to means-tested schemes has focused 
on obligations rather than entitlements. Of central importance in this respect is that mothers' 
right to an income without the corresponding duty to apply for, look for, or take up, paid 
work has been dismantled. The provision of care for children is no longer considered a 
reason for exemption from paid work. As Bussemaker notes, 'there has been discussion only 
on the question of whether an exception should be made for mothers with very young 
children and if so where the age boundary should be drawn' (1997: 109). This was reinforced 
by the 'New General Social Assistance Act (ABW - Algemene BijstandsWet) which came into 
force in January 1996. Insofar as the ABW 'stresses the importance of the claimant 
maintaining his or her ties with the labour market and making preparation for future 
participation during periods when caring tasks are being carried out', it effectively marked 
a change in the treatment of lone mothers as workers rather than homemakers (Bussemaker 
et al, 1997).   
 
The mixed consequences of the Dutch individualisation strategy has been commented on by 
Sainsbury (1996). On the one hand, she notes that the ‘introduction of reforms to 
individualise women's social rights - not merely remove supplements for family members as 
in the UK - gave Dutch women new entitlements’ and that the Dutch strategy ‘created a 
favourable climate to establish eligibility requirements in employee insurance schemes that 
accommodate women's working patterns’, resulting in ‘a change in childcare policies from 
tax exemptions towards provision of care facilities (but not the right to childcare)’. On the 
other hand, it has also it ‘strengthened the rationale for introducing work obligations for 
mothers with young children’ (1996: 216-7). Indeed, central to the Dutch social security 
system is the principle of self-support: partners of the unemployed now are expected, 
wherever possible, to seek work (mirroring the Joint Claims procedure recently introduced 
in the UK). Individuals are exempt from the work test if they are responsible for the care of 
one or more children aged under 5 years old.  Where children are aged 5 or more, cases are 
examined on an individual basis in order to determine whether there are any grounds for 
exempting recipients from the general obligation to take up paid work. If no good reason can 
be established, mothers are expected to become active in the labour market and, like other 
   
clients, are subject to job search and acceptance rules (they are no longer free to refuse a job 
below their qualifications) (Van Der Veen and Trommel, 1999). For those unable to find 
work, decentralised social service agencies assist recipients with job search and training for 
work. Municipalities are charged with labour market integration, and are in essence 
responsible for implementing the legislation. The responses by municipalities have been 
varied: some have strictly applied the legislation, punishing those who do not make sufficient 
efforts to find a job; others have marginalised lone mothers as a category of benefit recipients 
who cannot be readily employed; others have used their discretion creatively in order to 
support lone mothers according to their needs (Bussemaker, 1997: 117; Van Drenth, Knijn 
and Lewis, 1999).  
 
Alongside this growing emphasis on mothers’ obligations to take up paid work, Plantenga et 
al argue that central also to The Netherlands' individualisation strategy is 'the strong 
emphasis on the equal sharing of time, between paid and unpaid work as well as between 
men and women' (1999: 100). In other words, The Netherlands has sought a degree of 
gender reconstruction in its 'working time regime' to accompany individualisation 
(Plantenga et al, 1999; Sainsbury, 1996). This essentially entails adjustments to the gender 
division of labour in order to encourage women's participation in employment. Although the 
ABW did not introduce a right to public childcare and childcare remains strictly a private 
family responsibility, unpaid parental leave (paid for public sector employees) is designed 
to help parents combine paid work and caring (Van Drenth, Knijn and Lewis, 1999). Given 
these constraints, part-time work has become the most popular and the most realistic option 
for many women. The Netherlands now has the highest proportion of women working part-
time: in 1996 68.3 per cent of women worked part-time, compared with 31.5 per cent in the 
EU as a whole. Part-time work has been encouraged by the removal of hour thresholds in 
minimum wage regulations and social security regulations have almost abolished these 
thresholds. Critics have pointed out that beneficiaries of national assistance are only allowed 
to add a small amount of market income to their benefits, so it does not pay to work only a 
few hours a week. Indeed, it is only economically worthwhile to work at least 32 hours a 
week This means that individuals are realistically faced with having to choose either benefit 
paid at social minimum or income from full-time paid work (Delft and Niphuijs-Nell, cited in 
Bussemaker et al, 1999: 103).  
 
   
Overall, then, as Plantenga et al note, this policy shift by The Netherlands - its emphasis on 
mothers’ obligations to take up paid work and encouragement of fathers to share in unpaid 
work – has not necessarily resulted in equality of access to employment and   
 
the once strict division of labour between breadwinner and care-provider has been 
transformed in the space of a few decades into a one-and-a-half earner model, with 
women emphatically in the role of secondary earner. (Plantenga et al, 1999: 102)  
 
Indeed, although women's participation in paid employment has increased, men's 
participation in unpaid work has been 'disappointing', and the utilisation of unpaid parental 
leave by fathers is lower than by mothers (Van Drenth, Knijn and Lewis, 1999). In response 
to the continuation of gender inequality, the debate has shifted since the mid-1990s from 
that of encouraging women's participation in public life (employment) to encouraging men's 
participation in informal care. The Dutch Equal Opportunities Council ('Emancipatieraad') 
proposed a ‘twice-three-quarter model’ of work that it hopes will facilitate a more equitable 
division of paid and unpaid work. It proposed the further individualisation of the tax and 
social security systems, replacing the family minimum wage by an individual minimum wage, 
shortening the working week from 38 to 32 hours for the purposes of calculating benefits, 
and extending public care provision. Under this model, both men and women would be 
expected to participate in employment for four days a week and share unpaid work 
(Plantenga et al, 1999: 102).   
   
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
AGGREGATION AND INDIVIDUALISATION ISSUES IN AUSTRALIA 
 
The only non-EU country considered in this report, Australia, exhibits some strong 
similarities and dissimilarities with our EU case study countries.  As noted in Chapter Five 
Australia is sometimes categorised with the UK in comparative welfare state analyses.  For 
example, Siaroff (1994) and Shaver and Bradshaw (1993) for different reasons place the UK 
and Australia together in their classifications. The most frequently cited typology Esping-
Andersen (1990) placed Australia along with the UK and the USA in a ‘liberal’ group 
characterised by relatively low taxation, low public expenditure on social welfare and a 
strong emphasis on selectivity and means-testing in social security.  However, Castles 
(Castles and Mitchell, 1991; Castles, 1996) has argued that such commentators have 
misunderstood the character and impact of the Australian state because of their over-
emphasis on the highly symbolic ‘universality vs. means-testing’ dichotomy.  He has pointed 
out that the Australian ‘wage earners’ welfare state’ has  been predicated on a maintenance 
of income security and equality through central control of the wages system, distinguishing 
it from other liberal states such as the UK and USA though also marking the first of a number 
of similarities with the Republic of Ireland.  (Castles, 1985). 
 
Neither Ireland nor Australia developed the kind of extensive universal public welfare 
system found in many continental European countries.  Throughout the twentieth century, 
relations between the social partners (government, employers and workers) in both 
countries were regulated by central wage fixing mechanisms, initially called The AIRC in 
Australia, and successive Accords (wages policy agreements). 
 
In the early years of the twentieth century, government and arbitration court decisions 
commodified men’s labour (Edwards and Magarey 1995:5).  The same decisions, together 
with the introduction of a state subsidy for women bearing children – the maternity 
allowance or ‘baby bonus’ - simultaneously decommodified and familised the labour power 
of all women.  At the same time, i.e. the first half of the 20th Century, in Australia as in other 
countries, the welfare state was growing into a two-tiered system:  one sub-system for the 
   
‘independent’ white able-bodied working age men and another for dependent women as 
Fraser summarises it: 
 
[The first] set of programs is oriented to individuals [and] tied to participation in the 
paid work force .…. The second set of programs is oriented to households … tied to 
combined household income. (Frazer, 1989:149) 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the Australian labour market became less 
masculinised and the femininity of the welfare state (Shaver 1995) decreased with a sharp 
shift from gender difference to gender equality in both the discourse and the distributional 
effects of the social security system, culminating in the 1994-1996 changes to the structure 
of family payments and their re-orientation from men to women. 
 
Edwards and Magarey (1995) argue that the Australian social security system was 
predicated on contradictory assumptions about the position of women from its very 
inception in the first decade of the 20th century as a means-tested flat-rate social assistance 
system of income support, to the introduction of old age and invalid pension in 1908, and 
especially in the consolidation of social security arrangements during World War Two when 
child endowment, widow’s pension, unemployment and sickness benefit were introduced.  
On the one hand, women were and continue to be treated as independent of male partners 
in terms of their eligibility for payment, and entitlement is not derived from formal 
workforce participation of the woman or her partner as it is in most social insurance systems.  
On the other hand, women’s market-related dependency has been reinforced in the 
constitution of the married couple whether de jure or de facto as the unit of income and 
assets testing and as the unit of payment in the case of some benefits (Edwards and Magarey 
1995:42) 
 
A period of growth of restrictions on social security eligibility and assistance began with the 
abolition of widow’s pension in the name of equality well in advance of the achievement of 
equality for women in the Australian labour market (Shaver 1995). 
 
Public income support provisions in Australia differ from those in most other developed 
countries apart from New Zealand.  Payments are flat-rate and paid from general 
   
government revenue.  There is no social insurance provision.  Payments are made on a 
categorical basis with the most important categories being the aged, people with disabilities, 
those caring for people with disabilities, the unemployed, lone parents, the short-term sick, 
war veterans and families with children. 
 
Benefits are subject to income and assets tests but these employ generous thresholds 
compared with the similar tests applying to social assistance in other OECD countries.  There 
is an ‘extensive’ system of assistance with childcare costs and some assistance through the 
taxation system.  Those renting privately may be entitled to assistance with housing costs 
(Whiteford 2000). 
 
As Eardley (2001) noted the ‘quantum’ of redistribution available for the Australian welfare 
state has been and remains small limiting its anti-poverty effectiveness.  However within 
that constraint the effects of the highly targeted Australian system are significant in terms of 
both horizontal redistribution between family types and horizontal redistribution towards 
those with low market incomes.  This, together with the post-1994 direction of most family 
payments to women as the main carers of children, means the Australian welfare state can 
be judged successful both in general household anti-poverty and redistributive terms and in 
individual and gender equality terms. 
 
The issue of care or social reproduction and the rights to benefits of unpaid home carers 
(whether mothers, wives or other) was much more in the mainstream of Australian policy 
discussions in the 1980s and 1990s than in the UK, Ireland or The Netherlands. 
 
It is against this background that the individualisation agenda has progressed farther in 
Australia than in any other developed country.  This appears to be the result of two factors.  
The first factor is the strong political presence of women’s ‘voices’ both in the formal political 
system and the policy making community;  ‘Australia has achieved a unique and important 
network of structures which have the official role of promoting women’s interests.  At both 
the federal and State levels [there are] Offices of the Status of Women at federal level located 
within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’ (Bryson 1995:72). The second 
factor has been concern about low levels of labour supply among families in receipt of 
welfare (for Australian concerns about workless households, see Douglas et al (1993) and 
   
the Working Nation White Paper (1994)).  Working Nation recognised the need ‘for a major 
restructuring of income support arrangements for unemployed couples’ and recommended 
that income testing be applied to individuals rather than couples (1994:147).  Australia thus 
moved to improve women’s personal incomes and ‘unlock’ additional labour supply through 
the following means beginning in 1996 and continuing through to 2001. 
 
The couple rate of unemployment allowances was split and the income test partly 
individualised. 
 
1. A partial disregard of partner’s earnings for unemployed couples receiving 
jobseekers’ benefits was introduced; The first $30 is disregarded and thereafter a 
taper of 50 per cent is applied which continues up to the level of 40 per cent of 
manufacturing wages; 
 
2. A new (income-tested) benefit Parenting Allowance for those caring for children at 
home was introduced; 
 
3. An equivalent benefit for older wives over 40 and without recent employment 
experience, The Partner’s Allowance, was simultaneously introduced.  The means test 
for these two new benefits is individual but the amount due is reduced by 70 cents 
per $ of partner’s income over certain levels (Millar 1998: 34). 
 
Millar comments that women’s interests seem to have been well served by these new 
policies.  Although full evaluative empirical evidence is not yet available on the effects of 
these reforms, women do now receive a much greater share of social security income directly 
(ibid).  In addition Landt and Pech (2000) show that the changes to unemployment 
allowances have resulted in an increase in the reported labour supply of recipients up to 18 
per cent in 1998 from a base in the 1980s of next to nothing. 
 
Comparison of approaches to individualisation in the case study countries  
The complexities involved in classifying national social security or welfare regimes together 
with an absence of high quality evaluative evidence on the issues of concern in this report 
militates against any straightforward comparison of the various countries' regimes and their 
   
effects. In a search for transferable policy lessons, we have attempted to highlight  common 
policy legacies and dilemmas between the case study countries and the UK as well as noting 
key differences between them in  their ‘gender regimes’ and the recent policy approaches 
they have adopted to the definition of benefit units and the practice of aggregation. 
 
As regards the structure of benefits, Appendix Four presents a more detailed overview of 
units of assessment used for the principal means-tested benefits in our European case study 
countries.  We do not attempt to summarise these structures nor to compare their relative 
'generosity' or 'stringency' (for which a more detailed and resource intensive analysis would 
be required). It is, however, worth noting that the nuclear family (claimant, partner/spouse 
and dependent children) is the main unit of assessment in these countries, both in respect of 
entitlement (who is taken into account when calculating benefit) and coverage (who the 
benefit is supposed to pay for).  However, the ways in which adult dependants are recognised 
vary:  Ireland pays a 'Qualified Adult Allowance', a supplement paid in addition to the main 
unemployment payment (as it does with other non-contributory and contributory benefits) 
which is worth 70 per cent of the main payment, while Supplementary Welfare Allowance is 
expected to cover household needs and is made in the form of a single payment. The UK 
distinguishes between single and couple rates (the latter for a couple aged 25 or more in 
receipt of Income Support is approximately 57 per cent greater than for a single person aged 
25 or more). The Netherlands, like the UK, distinguishes between single, couple and lone 
parent rates of benefit but these rates are expressed as a proportion of the minimum wage 
(100 per cent of the minimum wage for Algemene Bijstand and 30 per cent for 
Toeslagenwet).  There are two other notable differences between the countries. The first of 
these concerns the inclusion of homosexual partners. The Netherlands is the only case study 
country which recognises homosexual partners in the assessment and payment of benefit; 
in the other countries same-sex partners are treated as two single people by the tax and 
benefit system. The second difference concerns the availability of the payment-splitting 
facility in Ireland, The Netherlands and Australia but not the UK. However, it should be noted 
that although special arrangements can be made for benefit to be paid to the partner of a 
claimant in exceptional circumstances in Ireland and The Netherlands, in both of these 
countries means-tested benefits may only be paid to one of the partners in the couple 
whereas Australian payment splitting has been more thorough going.    
 
   
In the Dutch, Irish and Australian contexts individualisation has been strongly driven by 
labour market concerns. Here, a key policy driver behind individualisation has been to 
increase women's labour supply, especially the labour supply of women partnered with 
benefit recipient men, and measures have aimed to increase women's access to market 
income first rather than benefit income (although this may be an indirect consequence in 
relation to social insurance). The significance – and difficulties - of such a strategy should not 
be under-estimated, particularly when account is taken of the fact that both the Irish and 
Dutch regimes have institutionalised a strong historical preference for women as 
homemakers. The Netherlands is more akin to the UK than Ireland in its near reversal of the 
principle that married women and mothers should not participate in employment. In The 
Netherlands, like the UK, the increase in women's employment rates has been channelled 
through part-time work in the interests of work-life balance.  Ireland appears to be heading 
this way too, but its strategy is being developed against a backdrop of lower rates of women's 
and mothers' employment and in the context of constitutional prescriptions that full-time 
mothers should not be worse off than working mothers. Although women's employment 
participation in all the countries  has indeed increased in recent years, it is not possible to 
assess precisely the role aggregation and unit of assessment changes have played relative to 
other  factors.  
 
In addition to labour supply concerns, individualisation has also been driven by a 
poverty/social exclusion agenda – as it is likely to be in the UK. Thus, the recent emphasis in 
Ireland on improving (universal) child income support, not too dissimilar from the UK’s 
development of the Integrated Child Tax Credit to begin in 2002/3, is a key element of the 
government's anti-poverty and welfare-to-work strategies as well as a key means by which 
mothers' economic independence is to be assured.  In neither Ireland nor The Netherlands 
does individualisation seem to be driven by a primary commitment to women's economic 
independence or their equality, although these issues do form an important policy backcloth. 
The equality discourse has been rather more in evidence in Australia. 
 
As regards the degree of ease or difficulty in moving previously breadwinner welfare 
regimes towards a more individualised basis, individualisation strategies encounter many 
more difficulties in systems which centre on the individual as the beneficiary with 
supplements for family members (UK and Ireland) than those which focus on the family as 
   
the unit of benefits and contributions (The Netherlands) (Sainsbury, 1996). This is 
principally because individualisation requires the reduction in the importance, or even the 
elimination, of women's entitlements as wives. This is a process which has already begun in 
the name of equality in the UK and Australia in relation to survivors’ benefits.  As we noted 
in Chapter Five, the Irish breadwinner variant poses particular problems for an 
individualisation strategy because, while it is far from alone in respect of aggregating hours 
worked and income in assessing benefit entitlement, its structure of adult dependants’ 
allowances is such that a key means by which resources are channelled towards women will 
be removed. In essence, individualisation entails gradually reducing financial support for 
'wifely' labour and it will have a detrimental effect on women who only have entitlements 
built up through marriage, and/or those who have meagre benefits as workers. It is this 
conundrum which Australia sought to solve through the introduction of Partners Allowance 
to parallel the Parenting Allowance. Ireland appears to be redirecting some of these 
resources in support of ‘motherly labour’ through the reform of its child support 
arrangements. On the other hand, and taking account of the more onerous work 
requirements for mothers, in The Netherlands individualisation has given Dutch women new 
entitlements (Sainsbury, 1996).  
 
Finally, we have highlighted that individualisation may lead to the introduction of more 
onerous paid work obligations on mothers and women in general and even the reaffirmation 
of the principle of aggregation, without corresponding improvement in women’s access to 
improved levels of social care provision.  In this sense, individualisation embodies the danger 
of becoming a strategy for parallel defamilisation and commodification processes in relation 
to female labour.  While greater commodification may be regarded as desirable in some 
quarters, it brings to the fore the necessity of recognising the community interest in social 
reproduction and how those who invest in it will be protected and integrated into an 
otherwise commodified society.  Individualisation in countries like Ireland, The Netherlands 
and the UK with their strong familist traditions necessarily then entails a broader re-
assessment of social provisions and the ways in which these affect the terms on which 
individual men and women are expected to participate in both paid employment and social 
care. Until these issues are addressed a narrowly conceived individualisation strategy will 
flounder in its own contradictions and  may lead to intolerable strains on family life. 
   
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
INDIVIDUALISATION AND POTENTIAL REFORM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Introduction 
In Chapters One, Two and Three we outlined the reasons why international and domestic 
policy agendas have turned at various times to greater or lesser degrees, to consider issues 
of individualisation and its converse, aggregation. Briefly, these were: 
 
1. The justice requirement to address ‘hidden poverty’ and the absence of social rights 
and social inclusion of women relative to men. 
 
2. The requirement to address economic inactivity and under-employment among 
women partnered with benefit recipient men, and, through that, address what is 
known in the UK as the work-rich/work-poor household divide. Despite overall rises 
in women’s labour market participation and a significant reduction in male 
unemployment in recent years, there remains a worrying concentration of income 
from paid work in some households and a concentration of lack of income from paid 
work in others.  This divide is regarded as making a significant contribution to both 
the extent and the depth of problems of poverty and social exclusion (HM Treasury, 
2000).   
 
3. The familial/social sustainability work-life balance requirement to accommodate the 
reality of women’s preferences for economic security and independence within 
families and thus make participation in two-parent households as attractive as 
participation in one-parent or sole-adult households, and to accommodate women’s 
preferences for a more realistic and less pressurised combination of paid work and 
caring. 
 
UK fiscal policy since 1997 has increased income redistribution from rich to poor working 
households. The use of household income-testing combined with other changes to the UK 
social security system has not, however, improved the personal incomes of wives and 
mothers (McLaughlin, 2001; McLaughlin et al, 1999).  Nor has it equalised the social 
   
protection that women receive relative to men. Thus issues of both inter-household 
processes of social exclusion and intra-household issues of social protection and equality 
come together to suggest the time is right for a ‘policy pause’ a time for reflection on the 
direction and implications of UK social security and fiscal policy reform. 
 
In this report as an aide to reflection within this ‘policy pause’ we have documented both the 
philosophical and economic rationales for a concern with aggregation and individualisation 
issues, and we have examined the historical background to these issues in the UK and recent 
responses to them in three other countries: Ireland, The Netherlands and Australia.  We have 
done so not to suggest that UK answers lie in simple policy transplantation nor through a 
belief in the value of social convergence, but rather as an illustration that reforms in this field 
are practicable and indeed are regarded elsewhere as making a positive contribution to 
work-life balance among all households and not only poor households.  
 
We believe the various reform possibilities of (1) full disaggregation; (2) partial 
disaggregation and payment splitting; (3) modernised social insurance and (4) a tax credit 
variant of the Australian reform model should be selected and assessed against five criteria, 
the first three of which are theoretical in nature, while the second two pragmatic. The first 
criterion concerns the degree of defamilisation new institutional arrangements would 
provide. As McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994) outlined, defamilisation refers to the 
conditions under which individuals engage in familial relationships and specifically the 
extent to which these conditions facilitate the enjoyment of non-patriarchal, egalitarian 
relationships. As such, defamilisation is concerned with the extent to which institutional 
arrangements provide individuals with the freedom to create their own familial moralities 
and practices within the space of intimate emotional relationships rather than being pulled 
or pushed into traditional structures, and associated moralities and practices which in the 
recent past have provided women with such little voice that for many ‘exit’ or non-entry has 
appeared preferable to engagement. The second criterion is that reforms should benefit 
those most worst off most - the minimax principle of Rawls and others.  Presently, mothers 
and other women caring full-time in low-income multi-adult households together with part-
time, low-paid employees with caring responsibilities are the two social groups with the 
fewest rights to social protection and the lowest individual incomes. The third criterion 
refers to the degree of ‘fit’ with existing policy logics; correspondingly, the fourth criterion 
   
refers to ease of implementation and the fifth to affordability, though affordability is 
notoriously difficult to assess depending as it does on how widely costs are defined and 
counted, whether indirect as well as direct costs are included and whether and how probable 
behavioural effects are quantified. 
 
The UK is not unusual, as Chapter Four showed, in international terms in having a significant 
‘policy gap’ in this area, nonetheless as Chapters Five, Six and Seven showed, other countries 
have progressed beyond the UK in the last two to five years, both in terms of thinking through 
the possibilities of reform and their reform practices in this area. The first of the drivers for 
the change identified above - the justice driver - has been given new legitimacy by the UK 
government’s decision to produce an individual income series paralleling the traditional 
household income series; the first of these was published in January 2001 (The Cabinet 
Office, 2001). 
 
Action to address work-life balance has some urgency as recent social attitudinal data 
continue to show that women in the UK wish to achieve a better balance between paid work 
and family life than they found possible in the 1980s and 1990s. Accordingly, reforms which 
increase women’s independent incomes from the tax-benefit system of social transfers and 
permit a work-life balance which is protective of health and family well-being should be 
prioritised over measures which would increase women’s incomes by increasing their 
earnings, at least where the latter is achieved by increases in hours of paid work.  There 
remains, of course, an unacceptable gap between men’s and women’s hourly earnings and 
our argument that it is time to address work-life balance issues and women’s desire to have 
socially-protected time to care does not mean we regard the achievement of equal pay as 
unimportant.  Clearly it is not, but even if this were achieved there would remain a need to 
provide social protection on an individual basis for those with reduced economic activity.  
Reform in this area must proceed from a platform within which positions have first been 
taken on the value which society wishes to attach to social reproduction and care, whether 
of children or adults. We believe some social transfers from those with little or no 
participation in care and social reproduction to those with high participation is entirely just, 
timely and in the community interest rather than just the interests of the individuals who 
would gain in the short-term.  
 
   
In what follows we consider four principal options for pursuing individualisation: (1) the 
social insurance route; (2) the full disaggregation of existing benefits and tax credits; (3) 
partial disaggregation and payment splitting as in Ireland and The Netherlands, and (4) a UK 
tax credit variant of the Australian reform package. The final option is the reform agenda we 
believe performs best against all criteria though all of these reduce the extent to which 
wives/mothers have to rely on their husbands for an income, albeit to differing degrees, and 
they would reduce the numbers subject to joint assessment for all or part of their 
entitlement.  It is important to note that some of the options require a long-term view of the 
development of the social security system. In addition, these options are not mutually 
exclusive and elements of each could be combined in a set of phased reform waves. 
 
1. The modernisation of social insurance 
This option involves extending and expanding National Insurance. Although such a reform 
choice runs counter to what appears to be an implicit policy of ‘burying’ social insurance in 
the UK (McLaughlin, forthcoming 2001), it is significant that the Irish reform agenda has not 
ruled out this possibility as an option for the future. This is in many respects the tidiest way 
of extending individualisation because National Insurance already operates largely on the 
principle of individual entitlement and payment and does not have the same depressive 
effects of labour supply that means-tested benefits and tax credits do. However, an effective 
strategy would require a considerable change in the insurance system otherwise women will 
continue to be disproportionately excluded from contributory benefits. 
 
The modernised social insurance model outlined by the Commission on Social Justice in 1994 
had the following elements: 
 
§ the removal of adult dependants’ allowances under insurance benefits; 
 
§ the introduction of allowances for children in insurance benefits, with provision for 
payment of half-rates to each partner if one partner is in receipt of an insurance 
benefit themselves;  
 
§ the introduction of ‘full’ insurance credits for those engaged in full-time care of 
children or adults, education, training, employment paid at rates below the lower 
   
earnings level or participating full-time in voluntary work.  By full insurance credits 
was meant those which give general entitlement under contribution rules for access 
to all insurance benefits and not just to state retirement pension as in the case of the 
current crediting system, Home Responsibilities Protection;  
 
§ non-contributory benefit levels (specifically Invalid Care Allowance) to be raised to 
that of contributory benefits and in the longer-term moved onto an insurance basis;  
 
§ the introduction of a part-time unemployment insurance benefit, and ultimately other 
benefits also to be available on a part-time basis;  
 
§ the introduction of a Parental Care Allowance (equivalent to ICA paid in respect of 
caring for adults) for those caring for children aged 3 years or less at home; mothers 
of children under 3 years old would be required to be available for paid work on a 
part-time rather than a full-time basis in order to be eligible for unemployment 
benefit; this requirement would also be waived if suitable forms of ‘out of hours' child 
care are not available in the claimant’s locality; 
 
§ universal Child Benefit would also be raised;  
 
§ the couple basis for assessment and payment of means-tested household benefits (e.g. 
Housing Benefit) would be retained but would affect fewer people as more of the 
population moved into insurance coverage. 
 
The reforms the Commission proposed would have meant the end of derived rights, the full 
recognition of the value of unpaid caring work for the purposes of calculating contributions, 
and a partnership approach to care.  The Commission envisaged the means-tested system 
acting purely as a residual, safety net or ‘emergency’ role.  Its proposals were intended to 
recognise the prevalence of ‘atypical’ or non-full-time forms of employment, recognise the 
value of prevalent types of unpaid work, and to provide more access to independent incomes 
for women and men, thereby reducing key sources of inequality between men and women.  
A key purpose of an individualised system of benefits is to promote independent incomes, 
but it should also contribute to a reconstructed system of gender relations.  By widening the 
   
range of social activities that are recognised by the social insurance system and feeding 
through to more general social and political recognition, an expanded and extended model 
of social insurance would recognise the value of social reproduction as much as economic 
production. 
 
The proposals of the Commission on Social Justice were intended to be implemented over a 
10-15 year period and were capable of laying the basis for a subsequent move to a 
participation or basic income over a 20-30 year period, if desired, either for the general 
population or for all people who are not currently in paid employment.  This would be paid 
regardless of their National Insurance contribution record or their partner’s income but 
would be subject to contribution to society through for example a Non-Workers’ Benefit 
(Duncan et al 1994). 
 
2 Full and partial disaggregation of existing benefits 
Taken to its logical extreme, a fully individualised system would entail total independent 
treatment in the social security system.  In addition to individualised social insurance, there 
would also be individual means tests for which only the claimant’s income and assets are 
taken into account (i.e. they would exclude those of their spouse or partner). There would be 
no dependant’s allowances, except in respect of children, in either insurance or income-
tested benefits and credits.  Every adult would be treated as a single person, as of course 
homosexual couples currently are in the UK.  Thus, all four aspects of the social transfer 
structure from coverage to payment would be individualised.  Each adult would be assessed 
on the basis of his or her personal resources and would be paid their own benefit. 
 
Individualised means tests were considered by Esam and Bethoud who argued that the 
‘assessment of premiums on an individual basis may reflect needs better than current 
arrangements do’ (1991: 27).  Assessing each individual in the married couple as a single 
person would benefit married people, providing they were both on benefit. Esam and 
Berthoud also argued that it ‘would also benefit most couples in receipt of the pensioner 
premium, when it is likely that both partners will be pensioners’ (ibid). Fully independent 
means tests have, however, been dismissed on a number of grounds.  First, it is assumed that 
they would favour the rich, as benefits would be paid to the ‘poor’ partner in an otherwise 
‘rich’ household. Second, they would increase the number of families falling within the scope 
   
of means-testing, effectively doubling the number of people claiming means-tested benefits 
and extending the role of means-testing with its problems of intrusion, stigma and 
compliance costs.  Third, the cost of fully independent means-tests is prohibitive, requiring 
a large increase in spending (ibid: 31-33).  Hills (1993) estimated full disaggregation would 
cost the equivalent of seven pence in the pound on income tax. 
 
Consequently a number of ‘weaker’ or partial versions of individualised means-testing have 
been aired.  Esam and Berthoud (1991) consider ‘partial independence’ alternatives to the 
independent means-test.  Under the partial independence option, each individual could 
apply for Income Support to meet his or her personal assessed needs, and would receive an 
additional amount for needs in which there are economies of scale (e.g. indirect housing 
costs).  The minimum independence option entails assessing personal needs against 
personal incomes, while benefits for common needs (housing, household and children’s 
costs) are assessed on a family basis. 
 
There have also been suggestions that benefits assessed on a couple basis should be 
subsequently disaggregated for payment purposes. That is to say, rather than disaggregate 
the first two parts of the social transfer structure (claiming and assessment of eligibility) 
disaggregation would apply only to the third part payment where each individual would 
receive payment on an individual basis worth half the couple-rate.  This practice currently 
exists and has existed for some time in Ireland and in The Netherlands where it is known as 
payment splitting and ‘administrative individualisation’ respectively.  It was considered by 
Duncan et al (1994), who considered splitting Income Support payments, where IS would be 
assessed on the basis of household resources, but the payment of IS would be split equally 
between the partners in a married/cohabiting couple.  Re-assessment would be necessary if 
one or other partner took paid employment or acquired income in some other way.  Although 
low cost, this option performs poorly in terms of both labour market and familial criteria, 
while Goode et al (1998) showed that such payment splitting may reduce the overall amount 
of income in the shared household pool and adversely affecting welfare.  Finally, this reform 
option renders highly visible the problem of the ‘lower’ couple rate in subsistence benefits 
compared to the single rate (that is, of couple rates being less than the amount paid to two 
single people). In Ireland, in recognition of this problem individualisation is being pursued 
for pensions by increasing the adult dependant allowance to near(er) the same rate as the 
   
personal payment for the claimant; the combined amount will then be shared equally 
between both partners. 
 
3.   A UK variant of the Australian reform package 
If we accept the dominant policy logic of Labour’s first administration, individualisation 
reforms in the UK today will be pursued in an environment of an increasing integrated tax-
benefit system rather than one of separate social assistance and insurance benefits on the 
one hand and taxation on the other.  Accordingly, we consider below planned and possible 
tax credit developments in the context of the issues considered in this report and whether 
those proposals could be modified or further developed so as to improve social protection 
for full and part-time carers.  The government’s new Integrated Child Credit (ICC) will 
effectively provide a modest basic income for children, paid to mothers presumably by giro 
for non-employed mothers and PAYE for employed mothers.  Mothers who lost out under 
WFTC will thus have their situations redressed; while mothers in couples receiving income-
tested Jobseekers’ Allowance and in couples receiving Income Support due to the disability 
of the main claimant will all now have part of the families benefit entitlement paid directly 
to them (HM Treasury 2000, and Budget 2000). Meanwhile, an employment tax credit will 
be introduced for all adults.  
 
Australian-influenced UK tax credit reform could take the form of a ‘ring-fenced’ 
employment and/or care credit for each adult.  Each adult in a couple could be given their 
own ‘protected’ or ring-fenced credit for participation in employment. This could go a long 
way to ameliorating the otherwise negative effects on labour supply which the expansion of 
couple-based income testing inherent in the tax credits approach involves.  However, the 
credit would have to be only partially taken into account (that is what is meant here by ring-
fenced) when a partner’s income is added to that of the first adult if women, especially 
women working part-time, are going to end up with a reasonable level of personal income 
(See also CPAG and Millar, 2000). Effectively this means disregarding partner’s incomes 
above certain levels so as to protect the credit of the other partner. This has many resonances 
with the Australian system of partial disregards of a partner’s earnings.  The Employment 
Credit itself could be paid at different levels so as to reward full-time over part-time paid 
work.  However, this would penalise carers relative to others unless a tax credit, for caring, 
equivalent to the Employment Credit, was introduced at the same time.  Accordingly, we see 
   
two reforms being require. The first such reform would be a facility whereby a partner’s 
earnings are disregarded above a certain level so as to protect each individual’s personal 
Employment Credit. The second such reform would be the introduction, for both its symbolic 
and material value and arguably its simplicity and flexibility, of a Care or Home 
Responsibilities Credit set at the same level as Employment Credit and again available at 
both part-time and full-time levels.  This credit could be restricted to those with pre-school 
children and/or caring for adults in receipt of Disability Living Allowance. To maintain 
incentives for employment individuals could be entitled to the part-time level of both the 
Employment and the Carer Credits but never to the full-time rate of both.  
 
When combined with the Government’s ICC, a full-time stay-at-home mother or other carer 
would receive a personal income of her full-time Care Credit and her children’s ICC rates, if 
any; meanwhile her partner would receive his full-time Employment Credit. The family and 
the mother could both increase their incomes by her participation in part-time work. A 
mother or other carer who worked and cared part-time would receive a personal income of 
part-time Care Credit by giro, part-time Employment Credit in her net pay and the family’s 
ICC, while her partner received his full-time Employment Credit. 
 
It should be relatively simple to establish the break off points for partners’ earnings  which 
would leave the other partner with an income equivalent to the full-time Employment Credit. 
The ICC is already regarded by many as a basic income guarantee for children. Here we have 
proposed that the next step towards developing a basic income guarantee for every adult 
which respects the significance of unpaid caring but also the importance of incentives for 
paid work is (a) the introduction of a Care Credit equivalent to the Employment Credit and 
(b) the introduction of part-time as well as full-time rates of both Employment and Care 
Credits. To ameliorate the negative effects of couple-based assessment for social protection 
and labour supply we also recommend (c) the introduction of partial disregards or ‘ring-
fencing’ of credited income through the use of break-even points in the tapers which act to 
prevent any adult with caring responsibilities ending up with no entitlement, all should be 
entitled to the equivalent of the full-time personal adult allowance rate of Employment 
Credit. 
 
   
In such a scenario, the Invalid Care Allowance would be abolished as would the carer’s 
premium in Income Support; indeed, Income Support for lone parents would no longer be 
required.  We believe the proposals are flexible enough to facilitate many choices in work-
life balance as between caring and employment and between the sexes whilst maintaining 
incentives for full-time employment. We have not discussed delivery issues which, as Millar 
(2000) notes, are of as much importance as the structural design of fiscal systems for the 
social protection of citizens.  We sum up both this chapter and the report as a whole with the 
table below (8.1) which presents a qualitative assessment of the reform options considered 
against the recommended assessment criteria. 
 
Table 8.1 Reform options estimated performance against selected criteria 
 
Reform Type Increase in familial 
voice 
Fit with existing 
policy logic 
Ease of 
administrative 
implementation 
Decrease in exit 
incentives 
Labour supply 
incentives 
 
 
Irish 
Administrative 
Disaggregation 
 
 
B- 
 
B- 
 
A 
 
B- 
 
E 
Dutch payment 
splitting 
 
B 
 
B 
 
B 
 
B- 
 
E 
 
Full disaggregation 
of existing benefit 
provision 
 
 
A 
 
E 
 
B- 
 
A+ 
 
C 
UK Tax Credit 
variant of the 
Australian model 
 
 
B+ 
 
A+ 
 
A 
 
A 
 
C 
 
 
CSJ Social 
Insurance model 
 
B 
 
D 
 
B+ 
 
B 
 
B+ 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
THE NEW LABOUR GOVERNMENT’S FIRST TERM REFORMS AFFECTING  UNITS OF 
ASSESSMENT 
 
 
WORKING FAMILIES TAX CREDIT - introduced October 1999. 
 
Non-taxable, non-contributory, means-tested, assessed on household unit. 
Replaced Family Credit as an in work ‘top-up’ to supplement low paid employment for 
families with children.  Eligibility requires at least one member of a family to be working at 
least sixteen hours or more per week with responsibility for at least one dependent child. 
 
Calculation of maximum WFTC is dependent on family circumstances.  When household 
income is less that the threshold of £92.90, maximum WFTC is paid.  When household income 
is greater than £92.90, a taper of 55 per cent of the excess is deducted from the maximum 
WFTC. 
 
A Child Care Tax Credit offered through WFTC pays 70 per cent of approved registered child 
care costs to a maximum of £100 for the first child and £150 for two or more children.  The 
CTC is restricted to households where all parents are working. 
 
One payment is paid per household.  The person who makes the claim will determine how 
the credit is paid.  If an employed person makes the claim, the employer will make the 
payment through the wage packet.  If a non-employed partner submits the claim, then the 
Inland Revenue will make payment by order book or directly into a bank account. 
   
MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FAMILY CREDIT AND WORKING FAMILIES TAX CREDIT 
 
The family and child components of WFTC have been increased.  The threshold or applicable 
amount has been increased from £80 in FC to £92.90 in WFTC.  The excess amount of income 
that exceeds the threshold is withdrawn at 55 per cent in WFTC compared to 70 per cent in 
Family Credit.  However, low-income families who may be in receipt of Housing Benefit 
and/or Council Tax Benefit will see any increased income negated, as WFTC is included in 
HB/CTB income calculations. 
 
The increased generosity of WFTC has extended eligibility of in-work support to a greater 
number of families but has developed an expanding means-tested domain.  It is estimated 
that because of tax credits, 38 per cent of all households will be supported by income-related 
benefits by 2003, compared with 24 per cent in 1999 (Dean, 2001). 
 
 
CHILDREN’S TAX CREDIT - introduced 6 April 2001 
Taxable, means-tested, individually assessed 
 
The Children’s Tax Credit (CTC) replaced the Married Couples Allowance (MCA) and the 
Additional Personal Allowance (APA), both of which were abolished one year earlier in April 
2000. 
 
The CTC is an income tax relief for people with at least one child under the age of sixteen and 
will reduce the amount of income tax paid by up to £10 per week.  To be eligible for the CTC, 
you or a partner must be in employment and paying income tax. 
 
· If one member of a couple is paying the higher income tax rate (40 per cent) that 
member must make the claim for CTC. 
· If both members of a couple are paying the higher income tax rate, the higher earning 
partner must make the CTC claim. 
 
· If neither is taxed at the higher rate, one member of a couple can claim the CTC in full or 
it can be split between a couple. 
 
   
The credit is gradually withdrawn when the individual income of either partner exceeds 
approximately £34,000, and it ceases to be paid when individual income of either partner 
reaches approximately £42,000. 
 
However, in a couple where neither partner pays the higher tax rate but who may have a 
combined income of £42,000 or more may receive the full CTC.  Those in low-paid 
employment will see their in-work benefit reduce as their net income increases (although 
the forthcoming increase in WFTC of £5 (June 2001) will help abate this loss). 
 
Those benefiting most from the CTC are expected to be middle-income families (IFS: 
2001a).   
 
MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CTC AND THE MCA/APA 
 
The MCA was a form of tax relief for married people, available to either husband or wife.  
From 1993 wives had the right to claim half the MCA.  The APA was a similar form of tax 
relief available to separated and unmarried people with children and of equal value.  The 
MCA and APA were available to all tax-payers.  The CTC is a form of tax relief for families 
with children and is withdrawn at 6.7 per cent from people paying higher rates of income tax 
(IFS:2001b). 
 
From April 2000, the effects of the introduction of the CTC are that a married earner without 
children will have lost a tax relief and will be taxed similarly to a single person without 
dependent children. 
 
THE INTEGRATED CHILD CREDIT  (ICC) 
 
The Integrated Child Credit (ICC) is seen as a way of merging the two separate systems of 
income-related payments to children living in ‘working’ and ‘non working’ low-income 
families (see HM Treasury 2000, Queen’s Speech 2001). 
 
A Tax Credit Bill in 2001 will introduce an integrated tax credit for families with children.  
The Integrated Child Credit (ICC) will combine the child elements from Income Support, 
Jobseekers’ Allowance, Working Families Tax Credit and the Children’s Tax Credit.  Eligibility 
   
for the ICC will be assessed on a couple’s joint household income and will be payable to the 
main carer similar to Child Benefit (Budget 2001).  The Tax Credit Bill will also introduce an 
employment tax credit for people and couples without children, to be paid through the wage 
packet based on the adult allowance in the WFTC (Queen’s Speech 2001). 
 
 
JOINT CLAIMS PROCEDURE FOR JOBSEEKERS’ ALLOWANCE - Introduced March 2001 
 
Taxable, means-tested, household unit of assessment.  
 
Both members of a couple claiming Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA) must now make a ‘joint 
claim’ in order to receive entitlement to JSA when at least one member of the couple is under 
25 and neither member is looking after a child.  Both members of a ‘joint claim’ couple must 
now fulfill all eligibility criteria as well as meeting labour market conditions.  That is, from 
March 2001 both members must sign a JSA agreement, be available for and actively seeking 
work: 
 
 Where one or both members of a couple are entitled to contributory JSA but not income-
based JSA they will individually receive their CBJSA allowance and not be subject to the 
joint claim procedure. 
 
 Where one or both members of a couple are entitled to IBJSA on its own or as a top-up to 
CBJSA, joint claim rules apply and the couple can decide which member should receive 
the payment. 
 
Sanction rules apply to joint claim couples as they do in single JSA claims.  Where one or both 
members of a joint claim couple are sanctioned: 
 
 The non-sanctioned member will be able to claim JSA at the single person’s rate where 
she/he is entitled to CBJSA. 
 
 The non-sanctioned member of the couple may claim IBJSA.  The income and/or capital 
of both members will however still be aggregated when assessing eligibility. 
 
   
Where both members are sanctioned but can prove ‘hardship’, a hardship payment of 
IBJSA at the couple rate may be paid. 
 
 
The government has recently announced its intention to extend the ‘joint claim’ procedure.  
From 2002 partners aged under 45 will be required to make a joint claim for IBJSA and both 
partners will be subject to JSA regulations and requirements. 
 
The current rates of JSA are: 
 
18-24     Single rate     £42.00 
18-24     Couple rate    £83.25 
Over 25  Single rate     £53.05 
Over 25  Couple rate    £83.25 
 
Currently, two single rate JSA payments for 18-24 year olds amount to £84.00, just  £0.75 
more than the couple rate.  However, two single rate JSA payments for those aged over 25 
amount to £106.10 - £22.80 more than the couple rate.  The question here is: if both members 
of a couple over 25 have to satisfy eligibility and labour market conditions, will both 
members be entitled to two single rates of JSA or one couple rate? 
 
MAIN CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE INTRODUCTION OF THE JOINT CLAIMS 
PROCEDURE 
 
Both members of a couple aged under 24, without children must fulfil labour market 
conditions.  They both must sign a JSA agreement, be available for and actively seeking work.  
After a claiming period of six months, partners will be transported into the New Deal via 
their status as a dependent partner of a JSA claimant where all aspects of participation are 
compulsory. 
 
One or both members of a joint claim couple may now be asked for further information 
and/or evidence to support their claim for JSA and one or both members can be contacted 
regarding any element of information in respect of their claim. 
 
   
DISABLED PERSON’S TAX CREDIT  
Introduced October 1999. 
 
Non- taxable, means-tested, household unit of assessment.        
 
Disabled Person’s Tax Credit (DPTC) replaced Disability Working Allowance (DWA) as an in-
work top up payment to supplement low-paid employment for workers with a disability.  
Eligibility requires the claimant to be working at least 16 hours per week and to be in receipt 
of a qualifying disability benefit. 
 
Calculation of maximum DPTC depends on family circumstances.  When household income 
for a single person is less than £72.25, then maximum DPTC is paid.  When household income 
for single person is more than £72.35, a taper of 55 per cent of the excess is deducted from 
the maximum DPTC. 
 
When household income for a couple or lone parent is less than £92.90, maximum DPTC is 
paid.  When household income is more than £92.90, 55 per cent of the excess is deducted 
from the maximum DPTC. 
 
One 30 hour credit of £11.45 is payable per family.  A child care credit is available within 
DPTC, the same as for WFTC. 
 
For a couple, the disabled partner should make the claim for DPTC.  If both members of a 
couple are disabled, the couple will decide who should be the claimant.  A claimant employee 
will be paid by the employer through the wage packet.  The Inland Revenue will pay a non-
employee by order book or into a bank account. 
APPENDIX TWO 
 
UNITS OF ASSESSMENT IN SOCIAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS GUARANTEEING SUFFICIENT RESOURCES IN WESTERN EUROPE 
 
 
COUNTRY BENEFIT BENEFIT 
UNIT 
RESOURCE UNIT RESOURCES TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT 
Austria Sozialhilfe Household 
(including 
grandparents) 
Household 
 
Beneficiaries and dependent 
family members living in the 
same household. 
Total income.  Exceptions include support by 
independent welfare organisations, care-related 
financial benefits, educational allowances. 
Belgium Minimum 
Moyens 
d’Existence 
(Minimex) 
Family Family (but recoverable from 
others) 
 
The spouses concerned;  the 
person only living together with 
an unmarried minor who is a 
dependant or with several 
children of whom at least one is 
an unmarried minor and a 
dependant, the person 
cohabiting or the person living 
alone. 
 
All resources regardless of nature.  Exceptions 
include family allowances for dependent children; 
social assistance granted by public centres for 
social assistance (Centres Publics d’Aide Sociale); 
study allowances granted to the interested person 
for the benefit of himself or his dependent 
children; donations (in certain cases); 
maintenance payments for dependent children; 
captivity pensions and war pensions; part of 
remuneration paid for activities within the 
framework of the local employment agencies 
(Agences Locales pour l’Emploi) up to BEF 150 per 
hour; moving, relocation and rent subsidies and 
allowances granted by the Regions; productivity 
bonus; grants, compensations and community 
benefits for the accommodation of young people in 
welcoming families. 
 
 
   
Denmark Social Bistand Family 
(cohabitants 
separately) 
Family (but not cohabitee) 
 
The claimant and children up to 
18 years. 
All resources regardless of source.  Exceptions 
include assets up to DKK 10,000 or up to DKK 
20,000 for a couple and the means needed for up-
keep of the family accommodation, for securing 
the professional activity of the beneficiary and 
his/her family or for access to education/training.  
Invalidity allowance and capital from 
compensation or accident insurance. 
 
Income from work is deducted except an amount 
of DKK 10.85 per working hour (only up to 160 
hours per month). 
 
Finland Toimeentulotuk
i 
Family Family 
 
The claimant and family. 
All earnings and assets of the applicant and/or of 
the family (some exceptions). 
France Revenue 
Minimum 
d’Insertion 
Family Family 
 
The claimant, 
spouse/cohabitant, dependants 
under 25 years of age. 
All resources including family allowances; 
earnings from activities, revenue from property; 
some special social allowances given to cover 
specific requirements. 
 
Maximum monthly resources for Guaranteed 
minimum resources: 
Single person:   FRF 2,552.35 
Household:       FRF 3,828.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Germany Sozialhilfe Family Household (and recoverable 
outside) 
 
The income and assets of the 
claimant and spouse who share 
a household; for unmarried 
minors living at home, account 
is also taken of parents’ income 
and assets.  Persons living in a 
quasi-marital partnership may 
not be better off than spouses. 
All income including child benefit.  All assets with 
some exceptions. 
Greece No general 
scheme exists 
- - - 
Ireland Supplementary 
Welfare 
Allowance 
Family Family 
 
The household – claimant and 
dependants. 
All cash income including the value of property 
(except the home), investments and savings.  
Family benefit payments are excluded from the 
assessment of income. 
Iceland Felagsley 
aostoo 
Family 
(cohabitants 
separately) 
Local Authorities Social 
Services – claimant, spouse and 
children up to age 18. 
 
State Social Assistance – 
claimant and spouse. 
Local Authority Social Services: all income 
including family allowances except housing 
allowances and home-care payments. 
 
State Social Assistance: All resources. 
Italy Minimo Vitale  Varies but 
normally 
family 
Varies but normally household 
 
Family as a result of a 
certificate of the family status.  
The law is extended to the 
effective family nucleus who 
live in the same flat and who 
share the surviving resources. 
All family earnings, except the family dwelling. 
   
Luxembour
g 
Revenu 
Minimum 
Garanti 
Household 
(with 
exceptions) 
Household 
 
“De facto” community of all the 
persons living in the same 
common household, obviously 
disposing of a common budget 
and unable to provide the 
evidence that they live 
elsewhere. 
All income including supplementary social security 
benefits excluding family allowances, maternity 
benefits and long-term care benefits. 
Netherlands Algemene 
Bijstand 
Family Family 
 
Claimant, partner and children 
under 18. 
All resources regardless of source.  Capital allowed 
before any deductions: 
Single person – NLG 10,000 
Married/Cohabitants – NLG 20,000 
Norway Stonad til 
livsopphold 
Family 
(cohabitants 
separately) 
Family (not cohabitant) 
 
Claimant, spouse and 
dependant children.  Common 
household features are taken 
into consideration for persons 
cohabiting. 
 
 
 
   
Portugal Rendimento 
minimo 
garantido 
Family Family 
 
In addition to the beneficiary, 
the following categories are 
considered as belonging to his 
family: 
 
Spouse/partner; relatives 
under age or persons treated as 
such; minors who are adopted 
in full or with restriction; 
minors in guardianship; minors 
placed in the care of the 
beneficiary by decision of the 
courts or by services 
responsible for the 
guardianship of minors; minors 
being placed into adoption if 
the process has already begun. 
 
Those who may also be 
considered, under certain 
circumstances, as part of the 
family if they are in a situation 
of total financial dependence on 
the recipient and have become 
of age: 
the parents; persons adopted 
through plenary adoption; 
persons adopted with 
restriction; persons considered 
equivalent; persons under 
guardianship; adoptive persons. 
All household earnings regardless of source except 
housing allowances, family benefits, study grants 
and work earnings and education scholarships to 
20% 
   
Spain Ingreso minimo 
De insercion 
Family 
(cohabitants 
separately) 
Family 
 
Family unit: living together of 
two or more persons who are 
related by marriage or an 
analogous relationship, 
adoption, blood relationship 
(between the 2nd and 4th 
degree) and relationship by 
marriage (up to the 2nd 
degree). 
All resources of the family. 
Sweden Socialbidrag Family Family 
 
The spouses concerned the 
person cohabiting or the person 
living alone. 
All resources regardless of their source. 
United 
Kingdom 
Income Support Family Family 
 
Claimant and family: i.e. partner 
and any dependant child living 
with them aged less than 16, or 
less than 19 if in non-advanced 
education (unless they are in a 
category entitled to claim in 
their own right). 
Almost all income resources, most social security 
benefits and pension.  Benefits generally ignored 
include Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit and 
non-contributory disability benefit. 
Source: Eardley et al (1996); MISSOC 2000 
 
 
APPENDIX THREE:   ‘Families of Nations’:   Family Obligations in the EU 
 
   
Model Characteristics Countries 
Individual Emphasis on individual entitlements and citizenship rights for all.  Lack of legal requirements for family to 
provide support.  Family support flows from parents to dependent children.  Extensive state support for 
parents.  Care of the elderly is responsibility of the state rather than the family.  Tax and benefits treat people 
as individuals.  Autonomy a key principle. 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Nuclear Family Tax and benefits systems recognise obligations between spouses, parents and dependent children.  
Cohabitation generally does not confer the same entitlements and obligations as marriage.  Services 
intended to support family care.  Formal equality between men and women.  Marked division between male 
breadwinner and female homemaker. 
Differences of approach regarding: 
(i)  legal obligations to provide financial support (downwards from parents to children – Ireland, UK; 
downwards and upwards (from adult children to parents) – Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands). 
(ii) care of children: presumption of family care of children (Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, UK); childcare as responsibility of state (Belgium, France).  Increasing emphasis in all countries 
on the obligations of parents to young adult children.  
Austria 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
UK 
Extended Family Clear obligations within the nuclear family, from spouses to each other, from parents to children, and within 
the extended family (grandparents, siblings, uncles, aunts).  Expectation that the family will be first port of 
call.  Services mainly for those without family.  Low state provision of child care for young children and that 
which exists is mainly educational or social in intent.  Low state provision of care services for the elderly.  
Cohabitation is not perceived as giving rise to obligations in the same way as kin relationships.  Privacy of 
the extended family as a whole.  Assumptions of dependency relationships in social security benefits and 
care.  Adult children are considered as dependents of their parents. 
Portugal 
Spain 
Italy 
Greece 
 
Source: Millar and Warman (1996) 
APPENDIX FOUR 
 
UNITS OF ASSESSMENT IN THE EUROPEAN CASE STUDY COUNTRIES 
 
THE NETHERLANDS 
BENEFIT UNIT OF 
ASSESSMENT 
AMOUNT CAPITAL  
ALLOWANCE 
HOW ADDITIONAL 
INCOME IS TREATED 
PAYMENT 
   
 
TOESLAGENWET 
 
If income from 
insurance based 
unemployment 
benefit is less than 
the social minimum, 
a means-tested 
supplementary 
benefit can be 
claimed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALGEMENE 
BIJSTAND 
 
 
 
Claimant and partner 
(irrespective of sex) 
 
 
 
The maximum 
amount of the 
supplement is: 
30% of the 
minimum wage for 
a couple; 
 
27% of this wage 
for single parents; 
 
21% for single 
persons. 
 
Lower rates apply 
to single people 
under 23. 
 
 
   
   
 
Provides financial 
resources to those 
unable to meet the 
essential cost of 
supporting 
themselves or their 
family.  
 
In addition, local 
municipalities can 
provide other 
allowances. 
 
Family 
 
The standard rate 
is determined at 
national level and is 
linked to the net 
minimum wage. 
 
Couples 
(irrespective of 
sex) aged 21-26 – 
100% of net 
minimum wage; 
 
Lone parents aged 
21-65 – 70% of net 
minimum wage; 
 
Single person aged 
21-65 – 50% of net 
minimum wage. 
 
Local 
municipalities may 
award additional 
allowances of no 
more than 20% of 
the minimum wage 
for persons living 
on their own who 
 
All resources, 
regardless of their 
nature and origin.   
 
Allowed capital: 
Couple – NLG 20,000 
 
Single – NLG 10,000 
 
Part of the earnings 
from part-time 
employment is not 
taken into account. 
 
   
are unable to share 
housing costs. 
 
 
 
   
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
   
BENEFIT U of A AMOUNT CAPITAL  
ALLOWANCE 
HOW ADDITIONAL 
INCOME IS TREATED 
PAYMENT 
   
 
INCOME SUPPORT 
 
Income Support is a 
benefit for people 
with an income 
below a prescribed 
level.  It is not paid 
to unemployed 
people who have to 
be available for and 
actively seeking 
work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household – 
Claimant and partner  
(heterosexual 
couple) and family. 
 
 
 
 
 
Single 
16-17 - £31.95  
18-24 - £42 
25+    - £53.05 
 
Lone Parent 
Under 18 – usual 
rate - £31.95 
Under 18 – in 
certain 
circumstances - 
£42.00 
Couple 
Both under 18 - 
£63.35 
Both 18 or over -  
£83.25 
 
Dependent 
children 
0 to September 
after 16th birthday 
– 31.451 
September after 
16th birthday to 
 
 
 
 
Entitlement is 
disallowed if you 
and/or partner have 
any capital or 
savings over £8,000.  
 
The first £3,000 is 
ignored but a tariff 
income on 
£3,000-£8,000 is 
calculated (assumed 
income of £1 per 
£250) and deducted 
from payment. 
 
A child’s capital does 
not count in the 
assessment of capital 
but if it is more than 
£3,000, no benefit 
will be received for 
the child. 
 
 
 
 
 
Single 
First £5 of income 
ignored.  Benefit is 
then withdrawn 
100%. 
  
Couple 
First £10 of income 
is ignored 
Benefit then 
withdrawn 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One payment made 
to claimant. 
 
 
 
   
day before 19th 
birthday - £32.252 
 
Plus any premiums 
   
 
 
INCOME-BASED 
JOBSEEKER’S 
ALLOWANCE 
 
Income-Based 
Jobseeker’s 
Allowance is a 
benefit paid to an 
unemployed person 
who has insufficient 
national insurance 
contributions  or 
who works less than 
16 hours per week 
and who is  looking 
for full-time 
employment.  It can 
be paid in addition 
to contributory 
Jobseeker’s 
Allowance as an 
additional means-
tested ‘top-up’ 
benefit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household – 
Claimant and partner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for Income 
Support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for Income 
Support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for Income 
Support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From March 2001, 
both members of a 
couple must make a 
‘joint-claim’ to 
receive payment 
when at least one 
member of the 
couple is under 25 
and neither member 
is looking after a 
child.  The couple 
may nominate either 
member to receive 
the one payment. 
 
   
WORKING FAMILIES 
TAX CREDIT 
 
 
Household – 
Claimant and partner 
 
 
Basic credits 
 
Single/Couple 
£54.003 
 
Child credit 0-16 
£26.00 
Child credit 16-18 
£26.75 
30-hour credit 
£11.45 
Childcare credit 
70% of cost to a 
maximum of £100 
for one child4 and 
£150 for two or 
more5 
 
 
 
Any  income or 
savings over £8,000 
excludes eligibility. 
 
Tariff income on 
£3,000-£8,000 
(assumed income of 
£1 per £250) 
 
 
When household 
income is less than 
£92.90, maximum 
WFTC is paid.  When 
household income is 
greater than £92.90, 
a taper of 55% of the 
excess is deducted 
from the maximum 
WFTC 
 
 
One payment.  The 
person who makes 
the claim will 
determine how the 
credit is paid.  If a 
working partner 
makes the WFTC 
claim, then the credit 
will be paid via the 
wage packet.  A non-
working partner can 
opt to make the 
WFTC claim and will 
be paid via an order 
book or into a joint 
bank account. 
 
   
DISABLED 
PERSON’S TAX 
CREDIT 
Household Basic Credits 
Single person 
£56.056 
 
Couple/lone parent 
£86.257 
 
Child credits 
As for WFTC 
 
Disabled child’s tax 
credit  
£30.00 
 
30-hour credit 
As for WFTC 
Childcare credit 
As for WFTC 
 
Any income or 
savings over £16,000 
excludes eligibility. 
 
Tariff income on 
£,3,000-£16,000 
(assumed income of 
£1 per £250) 
Single person, When 
household income is 
greater than £72.25, 
55% of the excess is 
deducted from the 
maximum DPTC 
 
Couples/lone 
parents 
When household 
income is greater 
than £92.90, 55% of 
the excess is 
deducted from the 
maximum WFTC  
If you are an 
employee the tax 
credit will be paid 
via the wage packet 
by the employer. 
 
Payment is usually 
made to the claimant 
but it can be made 
payable to the 
partner by the Tax 
Office if requested.  
However, if refused 
there is no right of 
appeal against this 
decision. 
      
   
HOUSING BENEFIT Household – 
Claimant and partner 
and non-dependants 
living at home. 
 
The amount of 
deduction for a non-
dependant in full 
time employment 
(over 16 hours) 
depends on the 
income of the non-
dependant (set 
income band limits 
are stipulated). 
 
Only one deduction 
is made for a non-
dependant 
married/cohabiting 
couple.  The 
deduction made is 
the highest that 
would have been 
made if they were 
treated as 
individuals.  To 
calculate which 
income band applies, 
Personal 
allowances and 
premiums as for 
Income Support, 
except for young 
people (16-24) 
and lone parents 
under 18 and 
higher family 
premium (lone 
parent) rate 
Any capital or 
income of more than 
£16,000 excludes 
entitlement. 
 
The first £3,000 is 
ignored.  Tariff 
income is calculated 
on £3,000-£16,000 
(assumed income is 
£1 for every £250) 
and deducted from 
payment. 
If income is less than 
the applicable 
amount, maximum 
HB is paid. 
 
If income is more 
than the applicable 
amount, a taper of 
65% of the excess is 
deducted from the 
maximum HB 
One payment is made 
to the claimant. 
   
joint income counts 
even if only one 
member of the 
couple is in full-time 
work. 
 
   
IRELAND 
 
 
 
BENEFIT U OF A AMOUNT  CAPITAL 
ALLOWANCE 
HOW IS 
ADDITIONAL 
INCOME TREATED 
PAYMENT 
      
   
 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
ASSISTANCE 
 
Paid to unemployed 
people who do not 
qualify for, or have 
used up, entitlement 
to contributory 
Unemployment 
Benefit.  
 
 
 
Household – 
claimant and 
partner 
 
If partner is working 
and earning less 
than IR£70 gross per 
week, then adult 
dependant increase 
is payable. 
 
A reduced allowance 
is payable where 
partner’s earnings 
are between 
IR£70.01 and 
IR£135.00. 
 
If partner earns 
more than IR£135 
per week, no adult 
increase is paid. 
 
 
Child dependant 
payment is halved 
 
 
Short-term (less 
than 15 months) 
 
Maximum personal 
rate            IR£84.00 
Person with one 
adult dependant  
IR£138.00 
Increase for each 
dependent child  
IR£13.20 
 
Long-term (15 
months or over) 
 
Maximum personal 
rate            IR£85.50 
Person with one 
adult dependant  
IR£139.50 
Increase for each 
dependent child  
IR£13.20 
 
 
 
Up to IR£10,000 
ignored 
 
IR£10,000 - £20,000 
means assessed at 
£1 per  thousand 
 
IR£20,000 - £30,000 
means assessed at 
£2 per  thousand 
 
IR£30,000 and over 
means assessed at 
£4 per  thousand 
 
 
 
Part-time or casual 
work up to 3 days 
per week: 
For person with a 
child dependant, 
60% of net weekly 
earnings is assessed 
as weekly means. 
 
For person without 
child dependant, a 
disregard of IR£10 
per day worked is 
deducted from 
weekly earnings and 
60% of remaining 
net earnings are 
assessed as weekly 
means. 
 
If partner works 1,2 
or 3 days earning up 
to IR£30, no 
deductions are made 
from payment.  
Earnings over IR£30 
 
 
 
Payment is 
made to the 
claimant.   
 
Where both 
members of 
a couple 
claim UA, the 
maximum 
amount 
payable is 
the 
combined 
amount of 
one personal 
rate plus one 
adult 
dependant 
allowance, 
plus a child 
   
when partner earns 
more than IR£135 
per week. 
 
 
 
 
are halved and 
deducted from 
payment. 
 
If partner works 4 or 
more days earning 
up to IR£70, no 
deductions are 
made.  Earnings 
over IR£70 are 
halved and deducted 
from payment. 
 
Note:  Means 
assessed from a 
partner’s insurable 
employment are 
always halved. 
 
Total means (from 
both claimant and 
partner) are halved 
in all cases where 
the partner’s income 
from any source is 
greater than IR£60. 
 
 
 
dependent  
allowance (if 
applicable).  
Each partner 
receives a 
payment of 
50% of this 
combined 
rate. 
 
 
   
  
 
   
 
SUPPLEMENTARY 
WELFARE 
ALLOWANCE 
 
SWA is a weekly 
payment 
administered by the 
Health Boards to 
people who do not 
have enough income 
to meet their needs 
and those of their 
dependents.  
Additional 
assistance is 
available for 
exceptional or 
urgent need. 
 
 
 
 
 
Household – 
Claimant and partner 
 
 
 
 
 
As for short-term 
unemployment 
assistance 
 
 
 
 
 
All cash income, 
including most Social 
Welfare and Health 
Board payments, the 
value of any 
property, investment 
or savings.  Child 
Benefit payments are 
excluded. 
 
A weekly value of 
any savings or 
investments is 
calculated to assess 
means: 
 
5% of first IR£400 is 
calculated and 10% 
of the balance is 
calculated to work 
out yearly value.  
Yearly value is 
divided by 52 to 
 
 
 
 
 
Any income over and 
above applicable 
amount is deducted 
100%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Payment is made to 
the claimant. 
   
determine weekly 
value. 
 
The value of any 
benefit or privilege 
(e.g. free board and 
lodgings) 
 
 
 
      
 
 
FAMILY INCOME 
SUPPLEMENT 
 
Weekly payment for 
families with at least 
one dependent child 
where either parent 
is working at least 
19 hours a week in  
low paid 
employment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household – 
Claimant and partner 
 
Hours worked by 
spouse or partner 
can be combined. 
 
 
 
 
 
Payment is 60% of 
the difference 
between net family 
income and 
prescribed income 
limit for the family 
size. 
(A minimum 
supplement of 
IR£10 per week is   
payable) 
  
 
 
 
FIS is paid for 52 
weeks and the rate of 
payment will 
generally not be 
affected by a change 
in circumstances 
(other than an 
additional child) or a 
change in weekly 
income for the 
remainder of the 
term. 
 
 
 
 
Payment made to 
claimant. 
 
   
 
 
 
     
RENT ALLOWANCE 
 
Payable to tenants of 
certain dwellings 
affected by the 
decontrol of rents 
before 26 July 1982.  
Following decontrol, 
a tenant suffering 
hardship from a rent 
increase may qualify 
for a rent allowance. 
 
 
 
 
Household – 
Claimant and partner 
and other non-
dependants living at 
home. 
 
 
Maximum payment 
is the difference 
between original 
rent (or a specified 
amount) and new 
rent.  Full payment 
is received if means 
are below a certain 
amount.  Allowance 
is reduced if means 
are above this 
amount.  Allowance 
may also be 
reduced because of 
non-dependant 
members of 
household. For 
every IR£85 income 
of other family 
member, IR£6 is 
deducted from Rent 
Allowance. 
 
 
Up to IR£10,000 is 
ignored. 
 
IR£10,000 - £20,000 
weekly means 
assessed at IR£1 per 
thousand 
 
IR£20,000 - £30,000 
weekly means 
assessed at IR£2.00 
per thousand 
 
IR£30,000 and over 
means assessed at 
IR£4 per thousand 
 
 
IR£25 of additional 
income is 
disregarded for 
those on a training 
programme or in 
part-time 
employment. 
 
 
Payment made to 
claimant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
   
RENT AND 
MORTGAGE 
INTEREST 
SUPPLEMENTS 
People in receipt of a 
Social Welfare or 
Health Board 
payment may qualify 
for a rent or 
mortgage interest 
supplement if their 
income is too low to 
meet housing costs. 
 
 
 
 
Household – 
claimant and partner 
 
 
 
 
The Health Board 
determines 
amount.   
Generally, the 
supplement will 
ensure that income 
after housing costs 
is not less than the 
Supplementary 
Welfare Allowance 
rate less a 
minimum 
contribution. 
  
 
 
 
IR£25 of additional 
income is 
disregarded for 
those on a training 
programme or 
where income comes 
from a part-time job. 
 
 
 
 
 
Payment is made to 
claimant. 
 £32.45 from October 2001 
 £33.75 from October 2001 
 £59.00 from June 2001 
 £135.00 from June 2001 
 £200.00 from June 2001 
 £61.05 from June 2001 
 £91.25 from June 2001 
                                                                    
   
 
 
APPENDIX FIVE 
 
EMPLOYMENT RATES IN THE EUROPEAN CASE STUDY COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
Employment rate as percentage of each age group     
       
 United 
Kingdom 
 Ireland  Netherlands  
       
 female male female male female male 
age       
15-24 53 59 40 46 59 62 
25-49 72 87 60 86 70 92 
50-64 51 68 30 67 33 63 
65+ 3 7 3 15 1 6 
15-64 63 77 48 71 59 80 
       
 
 
Part-time employment as percentage of each age Group    
       
 United 
Kingdom 
 Ireland  Netherlands  
       
 female male female male female male 
Age       
15-24 41 25 26 17 67 56 
25-49 42 4 29 5 66 10 
50-64 53 9 42 8 76 16 
65+ 87 67 47 21 82 85 
15-64 44 8 30 7 68 17 
 
Source: Eurostat 1999 
  
   
EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT LEVEL 
OF PERSONS AGED 25 - 59 
 
        
 UK  IRE  NL   
Employed: female male female male female male  
Third level education 27 27 36 27 28 28  
Upper secondary level 29 37 36 27 45 45  
< upper secondary 44 36 28 47 27 27  
        
        
Source: Eurostat LFS, 1997       
 
EMPLOYMENT RATES OF WOMEN AGED 30-39 BY MARITAL STATUS AND 
AGE OF  
YOUNGEST CHILD, 1986 AND 1997     
       
1986       
30-39 IRE NL UK E12   
Single       
No child <15 84 76 82 85   
at least 1 child <5 22 33 21 52   
at least 1 child 5-9 23 29 43 62   
at least 1 child 10-
14 
33 39 61 73   
Married       
No child <15 56 73 82 70   
at least 1 child <5 19 31 38 42   
at least 1 child 5-9 18 39 60 48   
at least 1 child 10-
14 
26 49 75 57   
       
1997       
30-39 IRE NL UK E12 E15  
Single       
No child <15 85 88 85 84 84  
at least 1 child <5 38 64 44 54 54  
at least 1 child 5-9 53 62 53 64 64  
at least 1 child 10-
14 
47 63 60 69 70  
Married       
No child <15 81 85 88 75 76  
at least 1 child <5 50 59 62 54 54  
at least 1 child 5-9 45 55 74 58 58  
at least 1 child 10-
14 
 
48 61 80 63 64  
Source: CEC  Employment Rates report, 1998)    
CHARACTERISTICS OF LOW-WAGE EMPLOYEES    
   
        
 IRE NL UK EU13    
SEX Concentration of low wage income    
male 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4    
female 1.7 2.2 1.7 1.8    
 Composition (%)    
male 28 19 19 23    
female 72 81 81 77    
AGE Concentration of low wage income    
16-24 2 3 2 2.2    
25-49 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8    
50-64 0.7 1 1.1 1    
 Composition (%)    
16-24 40 16 25 20    
25-49 50 66 51 62    
50-64 10 17 23 19    
EDU LEVEL Concentration of low wage income    
high 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4    
medium 0.9 1.1 1 1    
low 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4    
 Composition (%)    
high 7 9 9 9    
medium 43 64 37 45    
low 50 28 53 46    
        
Note: low-paid employees working at least 15 hours per week.  
 
Summary: For the EU as a whole, 15% of jobs are low-wage jobs, of which  
23% are occupied by men and 77% by women.  The proportion of low wages in these 
two 
Categories is, respectively 0.4 and 1.8 times the average 
proportion. 
  
Concentration index is particularly high for women in Netherlands. 
The Netherlands has also the highest proportion of women in part-time jobs. 
    
Source: Statistics in focus, Theme 3 - 
11/2000 
    
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF PAID EMPLOYEES AND PROPORTION OF PART-TIME 
WORK  
BY SEX       
       
 IRE NL UK EU13   
 Distribution of paid employees   
Male 59 63 54 58   
Female 41 37 46 42   
Total 100 100 100 100   
 Proportion of part-time work   
Male 3 3 3 2   
Female 24 42 34 24   
Both 11 18 17 11   
       
Note: low-paid employees working at least 15 hours per 
week 
  
Source: Statistics in focus, 11/2000     
 
 
Percentage of mothers employed part-time and full-time, for couple mothers and 
lone mothers, UK, Ireland and The Netherlands, 1994-1997 
 
 UK Ireland The Netherlands 
 1997 1997 1994 
 
Couple mothers 
(married/cohabitin
g) 
Full-time 
Part-time 
All employed 
 
 
27 
40 
67 
 
 
25 
14 
39 
 
 
9 
35 
49 
 
 
 
Lone mothers 
Full-time 
Part-time 
All employed 
 
 
20 
40 
44 
 
16 
13 
29 
 
17 
17 
36 
 
 
Source: UK LFS 1997, Labour Market Trends; Ireland LFS 1997, CSO; The 
Netherlands Bussemaker et al (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
EMPLOYMENT RATES FOR MOTHERS BY FAMILY TYPE, 
BRITAIN 1997 
 
   
Mothers  All Full-time Part-time 
     
Couple families 68 27 40 
Married  69 27 42 
Cohabiting  58 29 29 
     
Partner employed 73 29 44 
Partner not 
employed 
32 14 17 
     
     
Lone mothers 44 20 24 
Single  31 14 18 
Widowed  46 20 26 
Separated  56 26 30 
Divorced  48 21 26 
     
Source:  LFS, Labour Market Trends Nov 1999, Vol 107 (11): 586  
 
 
  
   
ILO EMPLOYMENT RATE FOR MOTHERS BY FAMILY TYPE - IRELAND 1997 
      
Mothers All Full-time Part-
time 
  
Couple  mothers 39 25 14   
Lone mothers 29 16 13   
      
Couple mothers      
0 dependent children 24 14 10   
1 dependent child 45 32 13   
2 dependent children 46 30 16   
3 or more dependent 
children 
34 20 14   
      
Lone mothers      
0 dependent children 16 10 6   
1 dependent child 34 20 14   
2 dependent children 38 20 18   
3 or more dependent 
children 
30 14 17   
      
Source: CSO, LFS 1997      
 
 
LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION LEVELS OF MOTHERS BY TYPE OF 
HOUSEHOLD , THE NETHERLANDS 1985-93  
 
      
      
    Child under 18            Child under 12  
 1985 1993  1985 1993 
Mothers in 2 parent 
families 
28 45  25 44 
Lone mothers 24 37  18 31 
Widows 14 27  7 24 
Divorced mothers 29 40  21 34 
Never married 
mothers 
16 29  15 28 
      
Source: Niphuijs-Nell 1997 in Van Drenth,  
Knijn & Lewis  (1999) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Working hours of mothers by week and in hours, by type of household, 
1993, the Netherlands 
 
       
 Average      
 Working hrs      
 per week  Working hours per week  
 Hours <10 10-19 20-34 35 Total 
       
Mothers in 2 parent 
families 
21 15 29 43 13 100 
Lone mothers 28 8 17 40 36 100 
Widows       
Divorced mothers 27 8 17 39 36 100 
Never-married mothers 29 9 10 40 41 100 
       
Source: Niphuijs-Nell 1997 in Van Drenth, Knijn & Lewis 
(1999) 
  
 
 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT RATE FOR MOTHERS BY FAMILY TYPE AND EDUCATIONAL 
QUALIFICATION – IRELAND 1997 
 
 PRIMARY LEVEL LOWER SECONDARY 
LEVEL 
HIGHER SECOND 
LEVEL 
 Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time 
Couple 
mothers 
5 6 12 10 25 12 
Lone 
mothers 
10 12 13 16 17 11 
 
 
Source: CSO, 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Employment rate for mothers by family type and 
highest educational qualification, 1997, Great Britain  
         
 NVQ4/5     
 All Full-time Part-time     
Couple families 81 41 39     
Lone mothers 68 44 24     
        
Source: Labour Market Trends Vol 107: 11.       
 
 
FEMALE POPULATION AGED 20-49 YRS BY THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN AND BY 
LABOUR STATUS, UK AND THE NETHERLANDS 
 
 % of female population of which % 
Employed 
 with given no. of children   
 UK NL  UK NL 
No. of children      
0 child 30.8 40.4  85.1 83.3 
1 child aged 0-14 24.2 18.4  67.7 63.9 
2 children aged 0-14 23.4 21  61.7 60.3 
3 or + children aged 0-14 9.7 7.9  45.4 51.4 
1 child aged 0-2 16.2 13.9  51.1 61.4 
2 children youngest aged 0-2 6.8 6.1  47.3 58.2 
3 or + children youngest aged 
0-2 
4.1 2.7  34.8 48.1 
1 child aged 3-5 17.3 13.8  54.4 58.5 
2 children youngest aged 3-5 6.1 5.2  60.3 57.9 
3 or + children youngest aged 
3-5 
2.9 2.5  45.1 51.2 
1 child aged 6-14 13 9.1  73.7 61.4 
2 children aged 6-14 10.5 9.6  71.9 63 
3 children aged 6-14 2.8 2.8  61.4 54.9 
      
Source: Eurostat 1999: European LFS, 
1998 
    
 
Labour force participation rate of mothers by number of dependent children, 
1991, 1996, 1997, Republic of Ireland 
      
      
No. of dependent children 1991 1996 1997   
      
One 33.1 42.6 43.7   
Two 30.2 43.2 44.3   
Three 21.6 33.2 33.3   
All  mothers 25.7 36.6 37.3   
      
   
Source: CSO, LFS      
 
Labour force participation rate for Females aged 20-49, 1996, Ireland  
 
      
  married married   
Age Group single 0 
children 
with 
children 
separate
d 
widowed 
20-24 72 81 42 53 31 
25-29 88 91 51 55 48 
30-34 85 87 52 57 45 
35-39 82 78 47 57 46 
40-44 79 65 42 56 47 
45-49 75 52 36 54 43 
      
 
Source: Ruane & Sutherland (1999) 
 
 
Employment population ratio for women by presence of children and partner -  
Netherlands  1995 
      
        
Mothers under 6 6 - 14 above 14 Total    
Couple mothers 49 52 49 50    
Lone mothers 35 40 39 39    
        
 
 
 
Labour force participation rates of women by presence of children, youngest child and 
partner – Netherlands 1998 
 
    
        
Mothers under 6 6 - 14 above 14 Total    
Couple mothers 55 58 53 55    
Lone mothers 43 51 45 46    
        
Source: LFS Eurostat in 
OECD 1998 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
POVERTY RATES OF MEN AND WOMEN  
BY AGE  - UK, IRELAND, THE NETHERLANDS 
  
 
  
    
 United 
Kingdom 
Ireland Netherlands 
    
AGE <18    
male 25 24 15 
female 25 24 15 
18-24    
male 18 11 25 
female 28 16 29 
25-34    
male 13 11 10 
female 17 13 13 
35-44    
male 12 16 9 
female 15 20 10 
45-54    
male 11 17 8 
female 14 15 9 
55-64    
male 11 18 6 
female 15 16 10 
>65    
male 23 10 9 
female 29 20 8 
    
Note: derived from the 1996 wave of the European 
Community Household Panel 
 
Source: Statistics in Focus 3-12/2000 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
PERSISTENT POVERTY RISK INDEX OF PERSONS 
BY HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS, 1996 
 
 
    
        
    UK IRE NL  
Type of household       
Single 
<65 
   75 154 234  
Single 
>65 
   203 99 50  
Couple 0 child <65   26 47 27  
Couple 0 child >65   137 54 27  
Single parent   288 234 189  
Couple + 1 dependent child  45 38 21  
Couple + 2 dependent 
children 
 60 50 81  
Couple + 3 or more dep 
children 
 146 180 185  
Couple + dep & non dep 
children 
 30 69 124  
Other    68 65 180  
        
Educational level of 
household 
     
High    21 4 33  
Middle    82 68 117  
Low    192 163 144  
        
Note:  
Index 100 = country specific average poverty rate; educational level refers to 
highest educational level of head and/or partner 
 
Source: ECHP 1996 in Statistics in Focus 13/2000 
 
